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ABSTRACT 
To meet the personnel shortfalls resulting from the Global War on Terror, the 
United States Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command developed an 
integrated approach to strength management—use of the ad hoc unit.  This came at a 
cost, however, generally in terms of lost efficiency and decreased capabilities to conduct 
tactical and operational Civil Affairs Operations.   
This thesis encapsulates fifteen months studying eight United States Army Civil 
Affairs units who deployed to Iraq as part of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Rotation 
06 – 08.  The research objective was to determine if the units were effective and what, if 
any, changes are needed to improve the training program prior to deployment. 
The thesis presents a better method for preparing ad hoc units for deployment, and 
argues that overall unit effectiveness depends upon leveraging time management 
throughout training, validation, and deployment. By creating a collaborative approach to 
task management and linking social, cultural, and task cohesion, the Army can more 
effectively execute pre-deployment training plans for ad hoc units. The thesis also 
recommends that the Army adopt both a refined training model that augments the Army 
Training Management Cycle developed in Army Field Manual 7-0, Training the Force 
and revise the training management program to focus on integrating fulltime 
collaborative efforts into the training development and execution cycle. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Civil Affairs have played an important role in reconstruction in every major U.S. 
military operation since the Civil War.  Today, the primary role of Civil Affairs in the 
United States Army Reserve is to “to plan, enable, shape, and manage stabilization and 
reconstruction and the enablement, reestablishment, and support of civil administration at 
the provincial level.”1  This role has increased dramatically as a result of the Global War 
on Terror (GWOT).  By December 2005, the United States Army Civil Affairs and 
Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), who oversees all Army Reserve Civil 
Affairs Soldiers, had mobilized and deployed over 98% of its assigned personnel to the 
GWOT.2 The result of this extremely high operational deployment rate, coupled with the 
high demand worldwide for Civil Affairs Soldiers, meant the Department of Defense 
(DoD) could no longer provide theater commanders with previously trained and 
experienced Civil Affairs Soldiers.  This problem was exacerbated by reserve component 
mobilization policies that limited the number of times and how often Reserve Soldiers are 
reused after their first deployments. 
As a result, in 2005, the Army developed a novel sourcing strategy to meet its 
large Civil Affairs manpower needs in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Instead of remobilizing 
experienced Soldiers, the DoD transferred Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen from their 
current assignments to Civil Affairs units.  These personnel, who represented over 75% 
of the rotational force deployed for OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) Rotation 06-
08, were provided basic training in both Army and Civil Affairs doctrine.3  Once the 
training was completed and these newly constituted units validated, the units deployed to 
Iraq beginning in the spring of 2006 for a one-year tour. 
                                                 
1 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.40 (FM 41-10), Civil Affairs Operations, 
September 2006, 2-18. 
2 United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), weekly 
deployment briefing, January 4, 2005. 
3 Basic training included an overview of basic rifle marksmanship, Army procedures and regulations, 
basic Civil Affairs planning and shaping operations, and U.S. Central Command defined requirements (e.g., 
radio and medical evacuation procedures).  Chapter II provides a more detailed breakout of training 
accomplished by the personnel assigned to the rotation. 
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The challenge of this new process was two-fold.  First, these newly transferred 
personnel had only four to five weeks to train together as a unit prior to deployment.  
That left little time for personnel to become acquainted and to begin working in cohesive 
teams.  Second, these units were expected to immediately assume the complex 
responsibilities of reconstruction operations in Iraq.  Failure to adequately transition and 
gain credibility had the potential to marginalize the CA units with their supported unit 
commanders. 
This thesis will look past the basic defined requirements for what units need to 
deploy and offer a new methodology to more quickly and efficiently organize training 
plans and prepare units for deployment.  The intent is to streamline the process so that 
changes in the field will more readily be incorporated into training cycles for future 
rotations. 
A. THESIS PROBLEM AND SCOPE: CHAPTER SUMMARIES  
Chapter I describes how the DoD sourcing decision, mobilization policies and 
training programs have created a complex problem that is decreasing the effectiveness of 
units during combat, stabilization and reconstruction activities. 
Chapter II analyzes how the Army currently trains, validates and deploys ad hoc 
and Reserve units.  As a result of the current strategic management structure, training of 
these units meets the minimum requirements for validating units for deployment, but 
overlooks many of the cultural and leadership details that contribute to cohesive units 
ready to assume the mission from the unit they are replacing.  The first place this 
shortcoming is manifested occurs during the Relief in Place and Transition of Authority 
(RIP/TOA).  Specifically, as units replace each other in theater, an efficiency gap 
develops as the outgoing unit hands off its operations to the incoming unit, thus reducing 
its influence on operations.  Likewise, it takes time for incoming units to gain the same 
situational awareness acquired by their predecessors. 
Chapter III looks at the efficiency loss developed during the RIP/TOA process 
and seeks to quantify how losses translate onto the battlefield.  This chapter focuses on 
team dynamics and their use as an appropriate strategic tool for dealing with the 
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complexity of wartime training.  The overarching goal is to overlay certain business 
models on strategic development and execution in order to pull lessons learned and 
expand the boundaries that currently limit collaborative training within the Army 
structure.   
Chapter IV presents an alternative model for training ad hoc units prior to 
deployment.  By achieving a more efficient and focused training plan, built on 
collaboration and active feedback loops, the goal is to reduce the efficiency losses that 
occur during RIP/TOA.  Over time, the increased efficiency gains achieved through the 
refined training program should improve the ability of ad hoc units to achieve their 
mission objectives in the military, interagency and multi-national environment. 
Chapter V summarizes the current challenges faced by the military when creating 
ad hoc units and offers recommendations for refining the training program. 
Appendix A provides a case study on the Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
(PRTs) and presents an alternative methodology for how to prepare and conduct stability, 
security, transition and reconstruction.  Appendix B summarizes the study protocols and 
presents a detailed summary of the four iterations of interviews and survey sessions 
conducted as part of this research effort.  Appendix C offers a summary list of interviews 
conducted. 
B. BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES MILITARY MOBILIZATION 
POLICY 
On 14 September 2001, shortly after the devastating attacks on the World Trade 
Center and Pentagon, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld issued the first policy 
memo on mobilization of military Reserve units to meet the new war on terrorism.4  This 
policy laid the groundwork for the mobilization of all Reserve and National Guardsmen 
in support of the GWOT.  The key component of this policy memo was that it defined 
eligibility to use the Reserves under the guidance of United States Code, Title 10, Section 
                                                 
4 “Partial Mobilization (World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks) and Redelegation of Authority, 
Under Title 10, United States Code, Section 123, 123a, 527, 12006, 12302, and 12305,” Secretary of 
Defense, September 14, 2001. 
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12302 (10 USC 12302), Partial Mobilization.  Mobilization of the Reserves is based on a 
four level, graduated scale.  The four categories are: 
 Presidential Select Call-up (e.g., Bosnia and Kosovo prior to 2006),  
 Partial Mobilization,  
 Full Mobilization, and  
 Total Mobilization.  
Each level has specific personnel and mobilization duration ceilings, eventually 
leading to full use of the Reserves for an indefinite period and ultimately including 
implementation of the military draft. 
Partial mobilization stipulates that up to 1,000,000 personnel may be called to 
active duty for a period not to exceed 24 months.  Partial mobilization is also the last 
level before a civilian draft can be implemented.  The challenge of partial mobilization is 
that 10 USC 12302 does not adequately define what the duration “24 months” means.  
Specifically, the wording allows the DoD to assume either 1) the duration is 24 months 
total per service member, with only one mobilization per operation (e.g., GWOT); or 2) 
the duration cannot exceed 24 months per individual service member per mobilization, 
but DoD has the authority to remobilize multiple times per operation (e.g., GWOT).  
To lessen the impact on individual reservists, Under Secretary of Defense Dr. 
David Chu issued his first Personnel Policy Guidance [PPG] for the use of the Reserve on 
20 September 2001.5  Two key issues resulted from the initial PPG.  First, “no member of 
the Reserve component called to involuntary active duty…shall serve on active duty in 
excess of 24 months.” Second, “a service member, who has been released from active 
duty prior to completing 24 months, may again be involuntarily called to active duty as 
long as the combined periods of service…does not exceed 24 months.”  As a result of this 
initial policy and interpretation of 10 USC 12302, the DoD, for all practical purposes, 
decided to mobilize and deploy all its service members before seeking to involuntarily 
                                                 
5 Department of Defense, “Mobilization/Demobilization Personnel and Pay Policy for Reserve 
Component Members Ordered to Active Duty in Response to the World Trade Center and Pentagon 
Attacks,” Under Secretary of Defense, September 20, 2001. 
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remobilize them.  This remained the case until January 2007, when the new Secretary of 
Defense, Robert Gates, changed the policy interpretation. 
For the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR), three challenges of the DoD interpretation 
led to an eventual breakdown of the mobilization process.  First, units considered High 
Demand / Low Density (HD/LD) quickly began to run out of cohesive units to deploy.  
The DoD defines HD/LD as “key military capacities that are much in demand but short in 
supply.  These force elements consist of major platforms, weapons systems, units, and/or 
personnel that possess unique mission capabilities and are in continual high demand to 
support worldwide joint military operations.”6  In the case of Civil Affairs, requests for 
forces from all the Geographic Combatant Commanders eventually overwhelmed the 
ability of the Army to meet the sourcing needs using first time, mobilization eligible 
reservists. 
Second, the USAR strained to maintain the assigned strength of its units.  Prior to 
September 11, 2001, USACAPOC(A) maintained an authorized strength of about 5,600.  
Of these authorized positions, only 78% were continuously filled, and many of these 
filled positions did not have personnel who were fully qualified to deploy in their 
assigned job specialty.7   Third, and most disastrous to unit cohesion, was the process of 
cross leveling personnel to meet requirements.  At USACAPOC(A), the Command 
assigned certain units as donors and others as recipients.  Donor units were stripped of all 
deployable personnel, and recipient units were filled to authorized strength.  While the 
initial cross leveling satisfied 100% of personnel requirements, this number slowly 
decreased until 2005, when it was considered sufficient if a deploying unit was only at 
80% of its authorized strength.8 
Simultaneous to the breakdown of mobilization processes, the training process 
also began to show increasing cracks as Reserve units arrived at their mobilization 
                                                 
6 William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2000), 35. 
7 Personnel Status Report provided by the USACAPOC(A) Personnel Section to the USACAPOC G3 
Mobilization Section, December 12, 2001. 
8 United States Forces Command deployment guidance to mobilization station, March 24, 2005. 
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platforms with little to no unit organization or equipment.  As the GWOT expanded and 
the use of the Reserves and National Guard increased to levels not seen since World War 
II, the Army realized that the training of personnel defined by the Cold War period was 
no longer sufficient.  Consequently, in 2004, General Peter J. Schoomaker, the Army 
Chief of Staff, and R.L. Brownlee, the Acting Secretary of the Army, issued new 
guidance for preparing and waging conflict.  A cornerstone of their new guidance was:  
Trained, cohesive staffs are key to combat effectiveness. Today, because 
our tactical headquarters elements lack the necessary joint interfaces, we 
have to improvise these when operations begin. That must change. Major 
tactical headquarters must be capable of conducting Joint Force Land 
Component Command (JFLCC) operations.”9 
C. DEPLOYMENT OF NEW BATTLEFIELD ORGANIZATIONS 
One of the fundamental changes since the beginning of the GWOT is the 
movement from a defined organizational structure to a hybrid system that uses traditional 
units (e.g., Infantry Brigades and Army Divisions) augmented by ad hoc organizations, 
such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and Human Terrain Teams (HTTs).  
Prior to 2001, the Table of Organization and Equipment defined how the Army was 
designed and manned.  The Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) is a document 
published by the Department of Defense which prescribes the organization, manning, and 
equipment of types of units from divisional size and down, but also including Corps and 
Army headquarters.   
There are four basic TOEs:  (1) the Base Table of Organization and Equipment 
(BTOE): this is an organizational design document based on current doctrine and 
available equipment. It shows the basics of a unit's structure and its wartime requirements 
(both for personnel and equipment). (2) The Objective Table of Organization and 
Equipment (OTOE): this is an updated form of the BTOE. It is a fully modern document 
and is up to date with current policies and initiatives. (3) The Modified Table of 
Organization and Equipment (MTOE): this is a document that modifies a Basic TOE 
(BTOE) in regard to a specific unit and is used when a unit's needs are substantially 
                                                 
9 United States Army, Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and 
Expeditionary Capabilities, Secretary of the Army (Arlington, VA: The Pentagon, October 2004), 11. 
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different from the BTOE.  (4) The Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA): this is a 
type of temporary TOE that is applicable to a specific mission and is used in an instance 
when there is no applicable TOE. 
While a TOE defines a specific unit type (e.g., Civil Affairs Battalion, Engineer 
Company, or Tactical Psychological Operations Company), this can still be too broad a 
designation to deploy.  Consequently, the Army classifies units by Unit Identification 
Code (UIC).  This UIC identifies for the Army operations and mobilization planners the 
specific unit (e.g., the 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion, Charlie Company/844th Engineer 
Battalion, or 345th Tactical PSYOP Company). 
After September 11, 2001, the Army realized that in many cases, the type of unit 
composition it was looking for did not exist within the defined world of TOEs and UICs.  
For example, U.S. Central Command did not require the entire 352nd Civil Affairs 
Command (CACOM) on September 12, 2001, but it did need the 352nd CACOM’s Civil 
Affairs Plans, Programs and Policy Team (CAP3T).  The first hybrid units thus became 
subordinate units, called Derivative UICs (DUIC). 
The benefit of the DUIC was this granted Army and DoD complete flexibility to 
define unit manning, equipment and training requirements.  Rank structures were 
tailorable to missions, equipment could be added or deleted based on mission analysis 
and, most importantly, Commands such as USACAPOC(A) could select which units 
would provide the personnel.  This had an immediate and positive effect on meeting the 
sourcing needs of the DoD as the GWOT expanded in late 2001 to early 2002.  By the 
time OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM began in early 2003, the use of DUICs for 
HD/LD units was a normal procedure.10 
The DUIC process foreshadowed the challenges that developed when ad hoc 
units, such as PRTs developed.  The challenge with the DUIC and most ad hoc units is 
that the very flexibility they provide in the areas of manning and equipping the units is 
also what causes the units to have difficulty training and developing team cohesion.   
Whereas defined units with a predetermined TOE and UIC know their staffing and 
                                                 
10 Daily Briefing slides, USACAPOC G3 Mobilization from November 2001 through March 2003. 
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equipment, and can develop training plans based on using these to accomplish defined 
missions, the DUIC and ad hoc units have none of these basic building blocks.  First, they 
may not have a clearly defined mission outside of the basic Army Operations Plan or 
Order.  For instance, the mission may be to Perform Civil-Military Operations.  Without 
training and knowledge of the civil affairs missions, it may be difficult to define the 
specific subordinate tasks needed (e.g., Provide Humanitarian Relief/Winterization 
versus Manage Dislocated Civilians).   
Second, without a clearly defined mission, developing the manning and 
equipment lists becomes difficult.  In early 2002, for example, the Task Force Horn of 
Africa requested a Special Operations (SO) Civil Affairs Company as a DUIC.  Since 
these were DUICs and since the doctrine for this type of unit was changing, the actual 
manning request was based not on mission analysis, but on a six year old graphic from 
Field Manual 41-10 that described what a “typical” SO Company might look like.11   
Third, when members of the ad hoc unit or DUIC meet at the Mobilization 
Station, they are now confronted with having to validate that they are mission ready.  The 
role of the Mobilization Station is to ensure Soldiers are medically, financially, 
administratively, and individually ready to deploy to combat (e.g., qualified on their 
assigned weapon or know basic first aid).  The Mobilization Station is responsible for 
ensuring the units are equipped, that the equipment is operational and that the personnel 
are trained in their missions and on operation of all equipment prior to deployment. 
For a normal UIC this task is relatively simple, if not time-consuming.  There are 
historical reference documents and Mission Training Plans (MTP) that define what a unit 
must accomplish to be certified in its specialty.  The DUIC and ad hoc unit does not have 
these documents or plans and thus the challenge becomes how to work through the 
labyrinth of requirements dictated by the Mobilization Station so that the DoD can safely 
state it is deploying a properly manned, equipped and trained unit into combat. 
                                                 
11 U.S. Central Command, Request for Forces to Support Task Force Horn of Africa, by U.S. 
CENTCOM (Tampa, FL, April 2002). 
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D. A NEW PROBLEM EMERGES FOR PREPARING CIVIL AFFAIRS 
RESERVISTS FOR DEPLOYMENT 
Beginning in October 2001, the United States Civil Affairs and Psychological 
Operations Command (USACAPOC(A)) at Fort Bragg began mobilizing Soldiers under 
OPERATIONS NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM.  By April 2003, the 
number of reservists mobilized for those operations and OPERATION IRAQI 
FREEDOM exceeded 2,800 soldiers.  By April 2004, this number climbed to over 4,200.  
Finally, in April 2005, USACAPOC(A) reached a milestone when it crossed the 5,600 
mark, effectively mobilizing the entire Reserve command to support the GWOT.  From 
that moment onward cross leveling lost favor as the preferred method to meet unit 
deployment requirements.  Instead, any new requests for Reserve units by the Geographic 
Combatant Commanders were met by creating ad hoc units, culling first the Command 
and then the military for anyone capable of meeting the diverse requirements needed in 
Civil Affairs.  
Between 2002 and 2004, USACAPOC(A) met its requirements by transferring 
Soldiers from other Army Reserve units.  When, in April 2005, the personnel deficiency 
grew so large USACAPOC(A) and the Army could not meet its requirements internally, 
the Joint Staff sought help from the Navy and Air Force to meet the projected shortfall of 
over 50% of the total request for OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM Rotation 06-08.12  As 
a result, in August 2005, the Joint Staff directed the other services to loan the Army up to 
525 personnel to fill out the Civil Affairs units in Iraq and Afghanistan.13  These new 
Civil Affairs personnel were assigned to work at all levels of the war, from tactical 
combat patrols through operational headquarters at the Corps level.  And while many of 
the slots were for functional specialists with little need for unit or even team cohesion, a 
large percentage of the personnel served in battalion and company headquarters.  
Two of these battalions designated to rotate into Iraq in 2005 as part of the 
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 06-08 rotation were the 414th Civil Affairs Battalion 
                                                 
12 U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Personnel and Unit Sourcing Strategy slide deck to the 




and the 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion.  The units had both already deployed to Iraq in 
2003 and 2004 and still had a small cadre of Army Civil Affairs Soldiers and leadership; 
however, now most personnel came from other services.  Even at the core leadership 
level, the unit did not resemble the Army most people know.  The Executive, Operations, 
and Intelligence Officers were Navy Lieutenant Commanders or Commanders, and the 
administration was staffed by Army Reservists from the Individual Ready Reserve.  In 
both units, only the commander and his Command Sergeant Major were Civil Affairs 
trained.  
As the personnel met for the first time in March 2006 at Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina, their primary concern was “what uniforms to wear, where was everyone living, 
and how to create a cohesive fighting force.”14  During the pre-deployment training 
program, each of these ad hoc units faced enormous administrative and logistics 
challenges.  For example, unit personnel were physically living in barracks spread across 
over four square miles, and neither the units nor the mobilization station had effective 
means of transportation or communications for commanders to keep in touch with their 
personnel. 
To summarize: in four years of wartime operations, the Civil Affairs community 
had developed from a small force of specialists typically working for a maneuver 
commander into a HD/LD unit so relevant to the fight that the Army no longer had any 
left to deploy.  But this evolution was hardly linear and tremendous gaps in training the 
units prior to deployment appeared. 
E. NEED FOR THIS STUDY 
It is likely the DoD will continue to create and use ad hoc units, especially joint 
ones.  In fact, on March 17, 2005, Charles Abell, the Principal Deputy Undersecretary of 
Defense for Personnel and Readiness, testified to Congress that the DoD has employed 
innovative joint operations “to spread mission requirements across the force where 
                                                 
14 LTC William Mason, interview with author, March 4, 2006, Fort Bragg, NC.   
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possible in order to meet mission requirements."15 He noted, for example, that Navy and 
Air Force members are supplementing Army and Marine ground forces in Iraq in such 
areas as Civil Affairs and Military Police.  
To ensure successful integration of these joint service units (i.e., U.S. Army, Air 
Force, and Navy) the DoD needs to continue to improve and leverage the divergent skill 
sets in each Service. Though this study specifically concentrates on the issues with 
sourcing and deploying Civil Affairs units, the challenges addressed affect any ad hoc 
organization DoD creates.  Ad hoc units are typically organized to meet a specific 
mission requirement and include personnel from disparate organizations and agencies, 
disciplines, levels of command, sectors of government, and can even include, non-
government actors.  Each of the participatory organizations has its own culture and brings 
to the table very different sets of expectations and approaches.  Typical training of many 
ad hoc teams in the past seven years has focused on mission parameters and leaves the 
issues of team cohesion and effectiveness to the individual unit leaders. 
A key component of this study was a field study conducted on eight Civil Affairs 
units over 15 months to determine how each approached and managed the function of 
training as a unit.  By comparing the paths that each unit took to prepare for war and then 
execute operations in a combat zone, this thesis hopes to identify better ways to 
effectively utilize the limited time available prior to deployment to increase the training 
efficiency of ad hoc units.   
Systems do not build bridges—people do via relationships.  Problems primarily 
arise as a result of occupational cultural clashes, group decision-making dynamics, or 
jurisdictional disputes between equal partners.  These problems may manifest themselves 
in any one of a number of ways: inability to understand or accomplish the primary 
missions of the organization, lack of collaborative skills, or as organizational and 
occupational cultural barriers between defined roles.  Because the DoD presently focuses 
on the physical systems for validating units for deployment, human dynamics have 
                                                 
15 Testimony of Charles Abell, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness to the Committee of the Armed Services Subcommittee on Total Force, The Stress on Military 
Capability, March 17, 2005. 
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largely been pushed to the unit level to deal with.  This causes considerable problems for 
ad hoc units who already have less time available to spend working through their 
organization issues. 
The existing body of literature for team effectiveness of ad hoc teams has 
primarily focused either on how civilian organizations build cohesion and collaborate or 
on the military actions of small units with very specific missions (e.g., strategic missile 
crews) or on prototypical units (e.g., 172nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team). This thesis 
draws on a number of academic studies on team effectiveness, how to make teams more 
effective, how to evaluate team effectiveness, and various frameworks for increasing 
team and group cohesion.16  
Unfortunately, there is no comparable body of literature that focuses on the 
creation, training, and validation of larger ad hoc units to perform conventional combat, 
stabilization, and reconstruction missions in wartime.  One of the most recent military 
studies was a study completed in 2003 by the Army Research Institute on Collective 
Efficacy in Multinational Teams.  The study looked at how the Stabilization Force 
(SFOR) in Bosnia sought to overcome the cultural and leadership challenges of 
multinational units.  But even this study noted that “literature is not complete and 
certainly when we try to understand the development of collective efficacy amongst 
                                                 
16 Audrey M. Korsgaard, David M. Schweiger, and Harry J. Sapienza, “Building commitment, 
attachment, and trust in strategic decision-making teams: The role of procedural justice,” Academy of 
Management Journal, 38 (1), 60-84; Paul M. Nemiroff, Paul M., William, A. Pasmore and David L. Ford, 
Jr., “The Effects of Two Normative Structural Interventions on Established and Ad Hoc Groups: 
Implications for Improving Decision-Making Effectiveness,” Decision Sciences, Vol. 7, 841-855; Anne 
Gero, “Conflict Avoidance in Consensual Decision Processes.” Small Group Behavior, Vol. 16, No. 4 
(November 1985), 487-499; C.C. Snow, S.C. Davison, S.C., S.A. Snell, and D.C. Hambrick, “Use 
transnational teams to blogalize your company.”  Organizational Dynamics (Spring 1996), pp. 50-67; 
Connie Gersick, “Time and Transition in Work Teams: Toward a New Model of Group Development,” 
Academy of Management Journal (1988), 9-41; J. R. Hackman and C.G. Morris, “Group tasks, group 
interaction process, and group performance effectiveness: A review and proposed integration.” In L. 
Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 8 (1975); J.R. Hackman, K.R. 
Brousseau, and J.A. Weiss, J. A., “The interaction of task design and group performance strategies in 
determining group effectiveness,” Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 16 (1976), 350-365; 
J.R. Hackman and R. Wageman, “When and how team leaders matter,” Research in Organizational 
Behavior, 26 (2005), 39-76. 
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cross-cultural teams, we find a lack of research and theory for measurement, for 
understanding its development and for understanding its influence on training.”17 
Yet, it is hard to imagine a more significant topic, given the need to cooperate and 
build consensus in these high stress, competitive environments.  It is critical that a portion 
of the preparation for deployment be devoted to understanding team members’ 
occupational culture, experience, and skill sets.  As this thesis will contend the challenges 
to ad hoc unit effectiveness must be addressed and solved during the pre-deployment 
training and validation process, or they will surface once the units deploy with 
detrimental effects. 
                                                 
17 Angela I. Karrasch, “Technical Report 1137: Lessons Learned on Collective Efficacy in 
Multinational Teams,” U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences  (Alexandria, 
Virginia: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, April 2003), 1. 
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II. THE CULTURE OF DEPLOYMENT TRAINING AND ITS 
CHALLENGES TRAINING MANAGEMENT 
When building cohesive units, there are two characteristics of the training process 
that can be measured.  First, there is the social cohesion that develops as team members 
develop social bonds and networks of friendship, caring, and closeness.  Cohesive units 
generally exhibit high social unity with members liking and feeling emotionally close to 
one another.  Second, there is task cohesion whereby a unit exhibits a shared commitment 
to reaching objectives.  Highly cohesive units are motivated and are able to synthesize 
their efforts, leveraging individual skill sets to meet the common goals.  In 1996, a study 
by Robert MacCoun on unit effectiveness determined that task cohesion must outweigh 
strong social cohesion for combat units to be effective.  He found that “when social 
cohesion is too high, deleterious consequences can result, including excessive socializing, 
groupthink (the failure of a highly cohesive group to engage in effective decision making 
processes), and insubordination.”18 
The Civil Affairs units’ pre-deployment training period lasted 60 days once the 
units were formed.  During this period the units primarily conducted basic Army and 
deployment training skills.  A example list of the core tasks completed during training 
included: basic administrative processing for pay, medical, dental, and legal; basic rifle 
shooting and crew served weapons familiarization (i.e., machine guns); cultural overview 
of the region; basic first aid and combat lifesaver; communications training on FM, HF 
and satellite radios; urban warfare training; training using the installations weapons 
simulation facilities; basic equipment maintenance and operation procedures; and limited 
battle staff and operational planning.  Non-Civil Affairs trained personnel also attended 
professional school training prior to the units activating in order to learn about the 
mission of tactical Civil Affairs units. 
                                                 
18 R.J. MacCoun, “Sexual Orientation And Military Cohesion: A Critical Review Of The Evidence,” 
In G. Herek, J. Jobe, and  R. Carney (Eds.), Out in Force: Sexual orientation and the military (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), 162. 
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Cohesion and team building processes themselves were impeded by 
communications problems, lack of equipment to train on, and a continuing requirement to 
send personnel to receive miscellaneous training they had not received prior to the unit 
forming.  Some examples of the unit level distracters included sending the both the 414th 
and 402nd CA Battalion’s Executive Officers and many of the team leaders who came 
from the U.S. Navy to the Mobilization Civil Affairs Course (MCAC) for four of the 
final five weeks they were at Fort Bragg.19  There was an almost continual need to send 
individuals to mission or equipment specific training (e.g., supply and communications 
systems),20 and there was a lack of rental or military vehicles to ensure that units could 
meet and develop cohesive bonding outside of the required mobilization training day.21 
One major challenge for the deploying units was that many of the service 
members who were transferred in from outside the Civil Affairs community did not 
attend familiarization training prior to March 2006.  As a result, they were sent to school 
for up to nine weeks during the critical forming, storming and norming phases of unit 
development.  In some cases, key leaders did not arrive back in their units until five days 
prior to the deployment date.  As LTC Mason concluded on the day he deployed, “We 
[were] prepared primarily to survive on the battlefield, our Civil Affairs skills [though] 
could not be learned overnight…there were many things that we were not able to 
accomplish before deploying and at times it felt like we were playing with mittens versus 
boxing gloves”.22 
When a unit replaces another, there is a period of adjustment that occurs when the 
old unit departs and the new unit assumes the mission.  Figure 1 defines this transition 
period and the qualitative effects on unit effectiveness.  Analysis shows that two events 
occur simultaneously to prevent full mission accomplishment during periods of unit 
transition.  First, the outgoing unit begins its transition home.  This involves tasks such as 
                                                 
19 Lieutenant Commander Carlos Iglesias (United States Navy) and Commander Timothy Myers 
(United States Navy), interview with author, April 27, 2006, Fort Bragg, NC. 
20 LTC William Mason, interview with author, April 29, 2006, Fort Bragg, NC. 
21 Command Sergeant Major Robert Zglenski, interview with author, April 25, 2006, Fort Bragg, NC. 
22 LTC William Mason, interview with author, April 29, 2006, Fort Bragg, NC. 
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creating continuity books, coordinating rearward movement, and reducing visibility and 
risk associated with conducting convoys.  Each of these events reduces the unit’s ability 
to operate effectively. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Standard Unit Transition vs. Effectiveness Curve. 
 
Alternately, incoming units, especially ad hoc units, face a daunting learning 
curve.  Not only are they still developing their task cohesion, but in many cases their 
social cohesion has not matured.  Figure 1 depicts how the outgoing unit efficiency curve 
and the incoming unit efficiency curve cross during the transition period.  Once this 
transition occurs, the incoming unit assumes the mission but still must fully acclimate to 
its environment, learn the region and culture, and become comfortable in conducting 
operations in a combat zone.  Interviews with over 20 different Civil Affairs Company 
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and Battalion Commanders indicate that units achieved a level of effectiveness and 
cohesiveness after spending 60 to 90 days in theater working their assigned missions.23   
The learning curve itself is continuous process whereby units slowly increase 
their ability to accomplish their assigned missions over time.  While specific metrics are 
achieved at each stage of the transition process (e.g., comfortability driving in a convoy 
or conducting security operations at a meeting), there are specific time-defined metrics 
that describe when a unit meets a given percentage of effectiveness.24 Based on 
interviews in March 2006 with the 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion, members of the unit 
predicted they might not achieve full mission readiness until 90 to 120 days into their 
rotation.25 When matched against with the 30 to 60 days of reduced effectiveness created 
by the outgoing units, the potential exists for a reduced overall mission effectiveness of 
up to six months out of every year long rotation period.26   
By seeking to improve unit effectiveness prior to deployment, units can 
potentially reduce the effectiveness gap of the incoming unit (identified in red shading, 
Figure 1) to 60 days from a normal of 90 to 120 days.  Over time, the potential results 
from revising training methods and programs would be threefold: increased unit 
                                                 
23 One challenge for this study was developing a consistent definition of unit effectiveness.  This was 
made difficult given the limited training in Civil Affairs Operations received by the ad hoc units prior to 
deployment, coupled with the overall operational requirements of the supported unit commanders who 
dictated the doctrine of Civil Affairs Operations regardless of its grounding in Field Manual 3-05.40, Civil 
Affairs Operations.  Overall unit effectiveness was defined by the units and personnel as the quantifiable 
ability to accomplish the assigned tasks of the maneuver commander within the time allocated and with the 
personnel and equipment resources available to the unit.  Effectiveness was not gauged or quantified on the 
ability to build or sustain systems (e.g., Rule of Law or Education) since each unit had a different set of 
doctrinal training, templates and guidance from higher command to follow. 
24 Refer to Appendix B and Appendix C for specific information on the surveys and personnel 
interviewed.  These interviews and e-mail responses were accumulated over a 15 month period from 
November 2005 through January 2007.  The majority of the commanders were reservists who served in 
either Iraq or Afghanistan between 2002 and 2006.  Each commander was asked (1) “How long did it take 
your unit to become fully integrated into the battle rhythm of the unit you were supporting?” and (2) “How 
long did it take for the unit to become effective in security and in accomplishing its assigned Civil Affairs 
mission?” 
25 This assessment is based on ten interviews conducted at Fort Bragg in 2006.  Nine of the interviews 
were with small groups of officers, NCOs or enlisted service members.  During each interview session, the 
group was asked how long they expected the transition to occur once the transition of authority was 
completed.  The tenth interview was with LTC William Mason, Commander, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion, 
and occurred at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on March 14, 2006. 
26 Further aggravating this inefficiency are internal unit movements, realignments of operational 
boundaries, and the compounding effect of every unit in theater going through the same process.  
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effectiveness prior to deployment, more efficient transitions between rotating units, and 
quicker transference of military stability operations to either Department of State or host 
nation government oversight.   
A.  THE TRAINING PROCESS 
The challenge for units, especially ad hoc units, is the limited time available for 
training and cohesion.  The normal training process for the Army is based on the Field 
Manual 7-0: Training the Force (October 2002).  In this document the underlying premise 
is that training development and execution comprise a two pronged approach.  First, 
training guidance and directives are passed down from higher headquarters to the units 
and second, the units develop training plans based on this guidance and then pass the 
plans upward for approval prior to execution.  As paragraph 1-19 states: 
Training is a team effort and the entire Army—Department of the Army, 
major Army commands (MACOMs), the institutional training base, units, 
the combat training centers (CTC), each individual soldier and the civilian 
work force—has a role that contributes to force readiness. Department of 
the Army and MACOMs are responsible for resourcing the Army to 
train…Units, leaders, and individuals train to standard on their assigned 
missions, first as an organic unit and then as an integrated component of a 
team.27 
Figure 2 describes the foundation of the training management process – the Army 
Training Management Cycle.  For the process to be successful, units develop their core 
Mission Essential Task List (METL).  The METL is an unconstrained statement of the 
tasks required to accomplish wartime missions. The METL is based on training and 
operational guidance provided by higher headquarters staffs.  A significant facet of the 
METL development process is that units only identify four to six primary tasks.  Each  
 
                                                 
27 U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-0: Training the Force (Washington,D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, October 2002), 18. 
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Figure 2.   Army Training Management Cycle. (From: Field Manual 7-0: Training the 
Force) 
 
company size element and above must create a METL. Typical examples of METL tasks 
are (1) Perform Mobilization Operations, (2) Execute Family Readiness Operations, (3) 
Conduct Civil Military Operations, and (4) Support Security, Stability, Transition, and 
Reconstruction (SSTR). 
Once the subordinate units create their METLs, it then becomes their 
responsibility to develop the long-term, short-term, and near-term training plans to utilize 
effectively available resources to train for proficiency on METL tasks. After training 
plans are developed, units then execute by preparing, conducting, and recovering from 
training.  The process continues with training evaluations that provide bottom-up input to 
organizational assessment.  
The METL system is further defined at the battalion and below level through an 
evaluative process known as Trained, Proficient, or Untrained (TPU).  In the TPU 
process, each unit is asked to rate proficiency at the individual level and then collectively 
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for the team and unit.  During the pre-mobilization and mobilization phases of 
deployment, these assessments become the backbone of the training plan for each 
company and battalion.  The intent of each unit commander is to ensure that the unit and 
each individual are prepared to at least a Proficient (P) level of execution.  For example, 
the unit may be responsible for a collective task: Conduct a Convoy.  Within this task, 
there are dozens of individual and team tasks (e.g., Perform Troop Leading Procedures, 
Conduct a Pre-Convoy Briefing, Check Weapons, Operate a Military Vehicle) that must 
be met for the unit to receive a “P.”  Each subtask is evaluated separately, but it is the 
aggregate task that determines the level of competence of a unit to perform its mission. 
The challenge for an ad hoc unit is that the process of rating and evaluating tasks 
must be done without months and years of prior training.  During a normal work-up for 
deployment, a unit may have months or years to prepare.  And for basic Army tasks, it is 
likely the Soldiers have spent many years performing the same tasks; they have become 
routine (e.g., Perform Troop Leading Procedures or Operate a Military Vehicle).  The ad 
hoc unit generally does not have this advantage.  Even if the unit is organic to a single 
Service such as the Army, many of the advanced tasks (e.g., Perform a Civil Assessment 
of a Water Distribution System) are not standard to most units.   
The result is that the learning curve becomes steeper each time a new task is 
added to a unit’s list, particularly if this is a task the unit has not studied, trained or 
worked on previously.  These complicating factors work against the very intent of 
mobilization which is to validate current training competency, conduct new training as 
needed, and move the units downrange quickly.  More importantly, the social science 
side of training, which is to build unit cohesion through team building, is marginalized 
since these types of tasks are not listed in the doctrinal training manuals as tasks, 
conditions, or standards for deployment. 
In summary, ad hoc unit leaders are constrained in two ways.  First, for METL 
tasks that are predefined (e.g., Operate a Military Vehicle), ad hoc units usually have time 
to meet minimum proficiency goals.  However, the time for the ad hoc unit to achieve a 
high level of proficiency is not available.  Second, as the task complexity increases (e.g., 
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Perform a Civil Assessment of a Water Distribution System), many times the METL 
development will lag as the ad hoc unit attempts to build a strong foundation before 
attempting to become proficient at advanced tasks. 
B.  AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW 
A second way to view the development process of unit training plans is to picture 
the training model as an hourglass with the neck of the bottle serving as the approved unit 
training plan.  As Figure 3 (left side) indicates, training guidance and direction are 
generally provided by higher headquarters while units take this guidance and direction, 
develop the METL , and once this is approved, generate their near-, short-, and long-term 
training plans.  
While acceptable in peacetime, the Army Training Management Cycle fails to 
address the challenges that occur when units have compressed time frames in which to 
develop and execute training prior to deployment.  During wartime, when ad hoc units 
are created (e.g., unique units, joint task forces, provincial reconstruction teams), the 
timeline for units to assess, resource, and develop a training plan is compressed (Figure 3, 
right side).  Further, often the personnel in these units are transferred from other units 
(i.e., cross leveled) or other Services (i.e., Individual Augmentee) and may have minimal 
knowledge and experience in how to conduct unit operations. When this occurs, the 
bottom half of the hourglass is compressed to the point that the units do not have the 
capability to adequately define their METL or develop appropriate training plans at the 
individual, team and unit levels.  
Instead, the leadership in higher headquarters takes on the added responsibility for 
the actions the units themselves are not able to achieve. Over time, the ad hoc unit will 
become familiar with its mission and unit cohesion will increase.  When this occurs the 
unit will be able to assume responsibility for the training plan development being 
managed by other organizations.  The goal for all the involved players should be to set 
the initial priorities and work patterns so the ad hoc units are able to focus on internal 
team dynamics and work their way through the virtual web (which can be more like a 




Figure 3.   Alternative View of Army Training Management Cycle. 
 
C. CONCLUSION: CHANGING THE INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL 
CULTURE  
Chapter II introduced the concept that training management is about developing 
effective plans which provide units the tools necessary to prepare for deployment.  Using 
the example of the RIP/TOA and how all units suffer from an efficiency loss during the 
process, the chapter laid out the foundation for one of the more complex problems facing 
units during the pre-deployment training, especially units that are ad hoc, have limited 




leadership positions. The end result demonstrates that the current process the Army uses 
to manage training—The Army Training Management Cycle—does not address what to 
do when things are not “normal.” 
Recognition of this concept requires a cultural shift that addresses the functional 
differences that exist for units that do not fit in the standard molds defined by the 
military.  In the case of unit training for combat, the critical goals are to have a complete 
training plan which encompasses the technical skills necessary to accomplish the mission 
and the soft skills of team dynamics, cultural awareness, and consensus.  A critical 
assumption of this thesis is that both of these skill sets are identifiable and transferable, 
and that the skills do not necessarily occur naturally but can be trained and developed in 
almost any specified group. The remaining chapters of the thesis serve as a forum to 
address the differences.  While actual training curriculum recommendations are beyond 
the scope of what should be included in the training program, the functional differences 
discussed here can provide a basis for what should be included in a training program for 
ad hoc, specialty type units, and temporary task forces.   
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III. THE EFFICACY OF THE TRAINING DEVELOPMENT 
PROCESS TO MEET MISSION REQUIREMENTS 
In Chapter I, we pointed out that one of the most fundamental changes made 
during the GWOT was the change in organizational design from a baseline Table of 
Organization and Equipment type of structure to a hybrid system that uses ad hoc units to 
meet specific personnel or operational needs on the battlefield.  This chapter focuses on 
team dynamics and their use as an appropriate strategic tool for dealing with the 
complexity of wartime training.  The overarching goal is to overlay certain business 
models on strategic development and execution in order to pull lessons learned and 
expand the boundaries that currently limit collaborative training within the Army 
structure.  The discussion of collaborative strategy is relevant to the topic of military 
training as a basis for understanding the importance of joint preparation and devising 
better responses to the constantly changing training requirements.  It is pertinent for 
understanding what a successful training plan accomplishes in a complex environment. 
A.  ELEMENTS OF A COMPLX ENVIRONMENT 
Prior to September 11, joint planning and the sharing of a common, consistent 
management system between various commands and organizations within the DoD were 
largely dependent on the level of local initiative.  During peacetime this process, though 
inefficient, was acceptable.  After the initial combat deployments to Afghanistan and 
Iraq, it became apparent that the normal system of training and doctrine development was 
inadequate to keep pace with the exigencies of the unconventional type of warfare facing 
troops.  As a result, numerous training and information initiatives have been stood up to 
compensate.  These systems, some new (e.g., Company Commander Online or Joint 
Knowledge Online) and some overhauled (e.g., Center for Army Lessons Learned), are 
now used to augment the doctrinal training requirements set forth by the military.   
Nonetheless, if the training plans themselves are to be successful, a more refined 
training program is needed which includes all agencies, remains up-to-date, and looks 
past the historic boundaries set for training development.  What is needed is a collective 
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strategy for execution expressed as involving a truly interdisciplinary network of planners 
and executers at all levels of the training process.  The following sections outline core 
principles of strategic management drawn from business, and links these applications and 
principles to the challenges of preparing units for deployment into combat. 
B.  INTER-ORGANIZATONAL COOPERATION 
N. Venkatraman and John Camillus define strategy as “a stream of decisions 
taken to achieve the most favorable match or alignment between the external 
environment and the organization’s structure and process.”28  In practice, strategy is 
more art than theory and serves as a balancing act among various components within the 
system that must be tailored to the individual goals and visions of the organization.  Most 
importantly, successful strategic development must be executed within the context of its 
environment.29  In its most basic form, strategic execution views the organizational 
requirements through a simple diagram (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4.   Diagram of Process Specialization 
 
 
Based on this figure, it is possible to argue, first, that organizations can be 
structured around throughputs—the processes or resources (the “ways and means”) 
employed in converting inputs into outputs (the “ends”).  The term “process 
specialization” can be used to emphasize this focus on throughputs or the common 
processes employed to generate organizational outputs.30   
                                                 
28 N. Venkatraman and John Camillus, “Exploring the Concept of “Fit” in Strategic Management,” 
Academy of Management Review, Vol. 9, No. 3 (July 1984), 514. 
29 Lawrence G. Hrebiniak, Making Strategy Work (University of Pennsylvania: The Wharton School 
of the University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School Publishing, 2005), 12. 
30 Hrebiniak, Making Strategy Work, 110. 
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In the case of ad hoc units, a severe challenge is in the definition of the 
throughputs themselves.  While the general output—a trained Civil Affairs team —is 
known, and the inputs are readily definable, the actual definition of what a “trained” Civil 
Affairs team means remains nebulous.  For example, is training defined as meeting the 
minimum combat skills to survive on the battlefield? Is it being competent in the specific 
skills needed to conduct the Civil Affairs mission?  Or is it something in between, what 
are the tasks, conditions, and standards to judge what becomes acceptable?  Without 
these basic guidelines, ad hoc Civil Affairs units have a difficult time just defining their 
basic boundaries. 
All organizations, regardless of size or focus, operate within a social environment 
bounded by certain parameters.  Organizations must continuously monitor and adjust to 
this environment to remain viable.  This is typically done by “…sustaining need 
recognition and responsiveness at high levels, both internally and externally,” and by 
adjusting business strategies routinely in response to the environment.31  The need for 
action and the amount of change required to execute operations grows with the volume or 
intensity of what the organization needs to accomplish. However, only when the need to 
change rises to a sustained level of importance does the leadership usually initiate change 
within the business structure and its core development strategy.  “The responsiveness to 
perceived needs takes shape as the organization determines its prerogatives…. The type 
of action thought to be useful moves the organization from avoidance to compromise or 
collaboration, depending on how the leader[ship] responds to the pressure for action.”32 
In 1995, Paul Nutt and Robert Bakoff developed a “mutualist” strategy for those 
who operate in turbulent environments with a need for high responsiveness and action 
(CA teams in combat, for example).  Collaboration was deemed the most important 
feature of this strategy.  Nutt and Backoff go on to list six basic characteristics of 
successful organizations employing the mutualist strategy:  
                                                 
31 P.C. Nutt and R.W. Backoff, “Strategy for Public and Third-Sector Organizations,” Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol 5, No, 3 (April 1995), 262. 
32 Ibid., 197. 
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 Key people set the tone by subordinating personal and organizational 
interests. 
 The organization develops an issue-centered focus of effort. 
 The organization establishes a consortium that draws key stakeholders into a 
body seeking to address emergent needs. 
 The organization uses the consortium to create or shape a vision to meet 
needs. 
 The organization seeks “win – win” arrangements for all affected parties. 
 The organization promotes trust so that stakeholders will cooperate in meeting 
needs and shepherding the consortium toward higher levels of cooperation.33 
C.  ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION 
A continuous threat which may go unnoticed during strategy planning is how 
complex it can be to consolidate requirements and manage the interdependencies, 
especially those that incorporate a broader environment.  While individual organizations 
typically focus on the task environment (sourcing, logistics, regulations, mandated 
training requirements), complexity in the overall environment (operational and strategic 
requirements defined outside the organization’s main focus) can make decision-making 
about viable courses of action difficult.   When organizations operate independently, or 
expend little on thinking about the strategic implications of their actions, the organization 
may suffer from being unable to conceptualize effective strategies or react efficiently to 
change.  According to Graham Astley and Charles Fombrun, organizations can overcome 
potential constraints and the ineffectiveness of independent actions through “…the 
creation of shared domains in which organizations can collectively, but not 
independently, maintain control of their own destinies.”34 
In the case of the ad hoc Civil Affairs units, where the units were composed of 
individuals from various military Services, a number of explanations fit the complexity 
                                                 
33 Nutt and Backoff, “Strategy for Public and Third-Sector Organizations,” 205. 
34 W.G. Astley and C.J. Fombrun, “Collective Strategy: Social Ecology of Organizational 
Environments,” Academy of Management Review, Vol 8, No. 4 (October 1983), 580. 
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challenges that must be overcome as outlined by Astley and Fombrun.  First, the absence 
of team-functioning skills training in the formal training plans could have resulted from 
the assumption that team members were expected to bring skill sets with them or develop 
them outside of the training program.  Another possible explanation was that the desired 
skills were expected to form naturally as unit cohesion built. And a third possibility was 
that those overseeing and managing the sourcing of personnel to the units were unable to 
ensure the member had the requisite skills prior to assignment to the team. 
D.  TRAINING EXECUTION AS A COLLECTIVE STRATEGY 
As laid out above, the need for collaboration is paramount to achieving a 
concerted effort within the training program to ensure all involved agencies and 
organizations are involved in the flow of resources and information.  In the case of 
training and validating ad hoc units or units with limited training time prior to 
deployment, the nature and flow of resources within the collectivity becomes more 
important than the structural arrangement.  Resource flows become the defining criteria 
by which the growth, adaptation, and dissolution of the training plan may be measured.  
Resource flows cross staff, agency, and organizational boundaries and include money, 
personnel, facilities and materials, and most importantly, information.  They are 
measured in terms their direction, intensity, and variability.  Three reasons account for 
the importance of resource and information flows within the training development 
process.  First, they are the basic elements of activity in organized forms of behavior.  
Second, task and sustainment of proficiency are essential to successful training and are 
manifest in resource flows.  Third, resource flows, if assessed, reveal process dynamics 
through which the strategic importance of members may be evaluated.35 
With this in mind, the ultimate question about training development for ad hoc 
units becomes “what are the relevant factors that contribute to the need for a redefined 
training methodology?”  In answering this question, four resource areas must be 
addressed.   
                                                 
35 Andrew Van de Ven, “On the Nature, Formation, and Maintenance of Relations Among 
Organizations,” The Academy of Management Review, Vol I, No. 4 (October 1976), 28. 
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First, information that drives ad hoc unit training encompasses the entire spectrum 
of knowledge from doctrine through organizational capabilities to detailed regional or 
country-specific data.  For ad hoc units, especially units where the personnel come from 
different organizations, developing a common doctrinal picture becomes critical.  
Doctrine is the standards, guidelines, and policies that define how and why organizations 
act.  A challenge for refining the training methodology is how to rapidly decipher the 
large quantity of data, needs, and requirements and to incorporate the resultant 
information into a new doctrinal design.  Critical to this doctrinal review and update is 
the requirement to ensure that changes are relevant across the whole spectrum of 
operations and do not address only a single specific action or threat. Information must be 
easily explainable and expandable to meet the worldwide mission requirements. 
Second, resources are driven by the organizational capabilities of the personnel 
assigned to the ad hoc units.  If personnel from the unit do not all come from the same 
type organization (e.g., Army Reserve, National Guard, DoS), each must then assimilate 
their disparate organizational experience and culture into the unit.  It is important to 
characterize what the key tasks, conditions and standards are that each organization must 
contribute. 
Third, defining the facilities and materials needed to execute training and 
education is crucial to success.  In the case of ad hoc units, this area cannot be under 
emphasized.  Normal operations are dictated by a needs analysis and detailed long-term 
planning.  Ad hoc unit, by definition, are not usually considered in the long-term 
development process.  Thus, when needed, there may be few facilities and materials 
readily available to train and educate the units prior to their deployment. 
Finally, it is necessary to ensure funding is adequate.  While in time of conflict, 
military funding may increase dramatically; this is not necessarily the case for other U.S. 
Government nor other non-governmental agencies and organizations.  Even within the 
military, the focus on the fight many times precludes focus on developing a robust 
training plan.  For long-term, viable education and training to occur, funding should be 
prioritized across all government agencies so that the military is not left carrying the 
primary weight during all phases of operations. 
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E.  CONCLUSION 
As one might expect a literature review on strategic training, development and 
execution suggests, the “first step in changing the culture of training is communication 
and information sharing.  The reasons and logic underlying the need for change must be 
complete, unambiguous, and compelling.”36  Many times training still tends to focus on 
core tasks as defined and validated by a limited number of individuals.  Soft skills are not 
necessarily ignored – in fact units train on dozens of tasks prior to deployment – but these 
need to be expanded.  As future rotations demand more ad hoc teams, cross functional 
training and revisions to training based on the needs of the unit will become increasingly 
important.  The notion that developing standardized training programs can be developed 
that are relevant for most units should be relooked to determine the best methods to 
ensure that ad hoc units also receive the most relevant and up-to-date training tailored 
specifically for their unique constituencies.  Critical within this planning system must be 
a review and incorporation of unit cohesion, collaboration and team building. 
The next chapter will outline how to achieve this goal – the development of a 
comprehensive program that leverages collaboration, consensus building, and distributed 
training development to better train units prior to deployment into combat. 
                                                 
36 Lawrence G. Hrebiniak, Making Strategy Work (University of Pennsylvania: The Wharton School 
of the University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School Publishing, 2005), 271. 
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IV. CHANGING THE TRAINING DEVELOPMENT PLAN 
Chapter II outlined reasons for efficiency losses during the RIP/TOA process.  
Chapter III made the case for a more refined collective and collaborative training 
development and execution system as a basis to begin to redress these problems.  In this 
chapter, the overall training environment and the need for a nexus between downrange 
operational requirements and development of comprehensive training plans are further 
described. 
A.  BOUNDING THE PROBLEM 
As Chapter II indicated, operations such as the GWOT and its subset campaigns 
in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Horn of Africa are all ill-defined and constantly in flux.  Ad 
hoc training programs with centrally focused, unilateral training may meet the end state 
goals in the end, but will not ensure units are as well prepared to deploy as they could be. 
In the case of training ad hoc and Reserve units for deployment the overall 
training requirements are constituted from many directly and diversely interested 
organizations.  When a unit then reports to the mobilization station, it is given a long list 
of requirements it must meet in order to validate and deploy.  It does so at the 
mobilization station which should be the repository of the latest, most relevant guidance 
and requirements for deployment.  While regular Reserve units may have their own 
research and training repositories, it must be remembered that the ad hoc unit usually 
arrives with limited to no resources to prepare itself for deployment.  Using the 
mobilization station as the repository makes it a central point to which units can turn to as 
they prepare to deploy.  Other units and organizations that influence training – whether 
providing inputs, resources or supporting outputs – likewise become dependent on the 
core mobilization station personnel to keep the training regime focused.   
When looking at the mobilization and deployment process, there are two 
units/teams teams that must work together to ensure the deploying unit is adequately 
prepared.  The first is the deploying unit itself.  The second is the mobilization team.  The 
mobilization team can be comprised of many different elements, including the training 
  50
brigade, weapons range personnel, medical staff, and transportation experts.  Each of 
these organizations brings diverse occupational and skill-sets.  While these experts can all 
provide important information to support the deploying unit, this can be a double-edged 
sword, however, since diversity can also present certain challenges.  Therefore, it is 
important for the mobilization team to realize that though they may be comprised of  
different organizations and units, when supporting the deploying unit, they are first and 
foremost a team, subject to all the dynamics of interpersonal relations.  
This becomes especially relevant as the stress levels increase within both the 
mobilization and deploying units.  For both units, decisions must be made quickly and 
accurately to ensure that all the training tasks are incorporated.  What often happens is 
that the mobilization unit staff becomes overworked with many participants involved in 
the process, but most of the decision-making occurs within a small vacuum of 
knowledgeable personnel.  Commanders frequently end up specifying or approving 
strategies and training that represent compromises between the training necessary for war 
and the time available to train the service members. 
Ultimately, how do you accomplish training and time management within the 
limitations directed by the various players tasked with oversight of training for deploying 
units? 
B.  DEVELOPMENT OF WORK TEAMS 
The concept of work teams is used in both the public and private sector.  They are 
especially valuable when the problem is considered wicked – where there is a basic 
problem, with no developed solutions or obvious endpoint; where each problem is unique 
and each solution may lead to other problems; and where each problem has many 
available alternative solutions.   The characteristics exemplified by the problem makes it 
inherently ambiguous and well suited for a collaborative process.  In the case of unit 
training for combat, the critical goals are to have a complete training plan which 
encompasses the technical skills necessary to accomplish the mission and the soft skills 
of team dynamics, cultural awareness, and consensus.  A critical assumption of this thesis 
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is that both of these skill sets are identifiable and transferable, and that the skills do not 
necessarily occur naturally but can be trained and developed in almost any specified 
group. 
The concept of a work team is further expanded by developing a formal definition 
of “team.”  Richard Guzza defines a team as a group of individuals who see themselves 
and are seen by others as a social entity, which is interdependent because of the tasks 
performed as members of a group.  The key to work teams is that they are interdependent, 
and this is the major factor that distinguishes a “team” from a “group.”37  Further, in 
order for work teams to succeed, the leadership must empower them to make important 
decisions.  The leadership must support the work team, establish boundaries for it, and 
train the team members so they have the skills and knowledge to accomplish their task.  
Ultimately, the work team is held accountable for the success or failure of the project.38 
For the purposes of this thesis we will consider the mobilization unit tasked with training 
ad hoc units for deployment and labeled the “training unit,” as the basic work team. 
In the case of training units tasked with training and validating ad hoc units prior 
to combat, this last criterion regarding accountability for success or failure is important.  
For most training units, the standard metrics of success are whether the unit deploying 
meets the minimum administrative, operational, and logistical proficiency levels to 
survive on the battlefield.  These standards are provided from a variety of sources (e.g., 
Army guidance, DoD guidance, regulations, doctrine, deployment messages, etc.).  There 
are rarely consequences for poorly preparing units for deployment, failure to ensure units 
attain a minimum level of cohesion, and neglecting to collaborate with external agencies 
and organizations to ensure that proper collective training has occurred. 
                                                 
37 R.A. Guzzo, “Group Decision Making and Group Effectiveness,” ed. P.S. Goodman , Designing 
Effective Work Groups (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1986), 42. 
38 Eric Molleman and Jannes Slomp, “The impact of team and work characteristics on team 
functioning,” Human Factors and Ergonomics in Manufacturing (Department of Management & 
Organization: University of Groningen, The Netherlands), Vol 16, Issue 1 (12 December 2005), 1-15. 
  52
C. FOCUS ON COLLABORATION AND CONSENSUS 
For ad hoc units to become effective they must receive comprehensive guidance, 
direction, and oversight throughout their pre-deployment training period.  For the unit 
conducting and overseeing the training, the best way to achieve these goals is to develop 
an internal collaborative and decentralized training management process across its staff 
and leadership and with that of the ad hoc unit. And while the ad hoc units must 
understand collaboration and team building, it is more important for the training units to 
execute an integrated, collaborative approach to training, and validating the ad hoc units 
for deployment. 
Collaboration requires that participants have highly developed interpersonal 
skills.  Collaboration reduced to its simplest definition means “to work together.”  In 
Collaborative Leadership, David Chrislip and Carl Larson offer a slightly different but 
also useful definition.  “[Collaboration] is a mutually beneficial relationship between two 
or more parties who work toward common goals by sharing responsibility, authority, and 
accountability for achieving results.”39 
How can the working team best train the ad hoc unit and turn it into a cohesive 
unit capable of performing its assigned missions? Group dynamics research began in the 
1940s with a focus on psychosocial and emotional aspects of group life.  But it was not 
until 1965, when Bruce Tuckman developed a unitary sequence to describe group 
dynamics, that the field really developed.  The sequence which Tuckman described is the 
same for every group, consisting of forming, storming, norming, and performing.40  
Tuckman postulates that as the team develops maturity and capability, relationships are 
established and the leaders change their leadership style. They begin with a directing 
style, move through coaching, then participating, and finish by delegating.  At that point  
they are detached.  Only after experiencing these stages will a team be capable of 
producing a successor leader so that the previous leader can move on to develop a new 
team.  Tuckman and Mary Ann Jensen further amended the Tuckman’s concept in 1977 
                                                 
39 Scott London, “Collaboration and Community,” prepared for the Pew Partnership for Civic Change 
(November 1995), http://www.scottlondon.com/reports/ppcc.html. 
40 Bruce W. Tuckman, “Developmental sequence in small groups,” Psychological Bulletin (1965), 3. 
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to add a new final stage – adjoining.41  In the adjoining stage, the team, finished with its 
project, disperses with members heading to other teams and projects. 
A second line of study in the field of group dynamics concerns phases in group 
problem solving.  The classic reference point is Robert Bales and Fred Strodtbeck’s 
unitary sequence model which defines three phases in a group’s movement toward its 
goals: orientation, evaluation, and control. 
What both schools of thought have in common, and what makes them important 
for military training organizations, is that they both regard group development as 
predictable, sequential progression.  The implication is that if concepts and processes 
emanating from outside the group are ignored, the overall training development process 
will become stunted.  The time spent during pre-deployment training will lead to 
successful development of certain skills, but group effectiveness will be diminished since 
the unit will not have reached a point of equilibrium where it realizes its limitations and 
seeks to address them. 
Collaboration plays a twofold role for ad hoc units.  First, research undertaken by 
Connie Gersick shows that the teams she studied “used widely diverse behaviors to do 
their work; however, the timing of when groups formed, maintained, and changed the 
way they worked was highly congruent.”42  Further, Gersick found that all groups change 
over time, but that each group displayed a distinct approach to becoming effective.  There 
was an underlying pattern where, at some point in the transition and “in a concentrated 
burst of changes, groups dropped old patterns, reengaged with outside supervisors, 
adopted new perspectives on their work, and made dramatic progress.”43   
Within the training system recognition of this should play an important role in 
training plan development.  Knowing that there are temporal milestones and that groups 
 
 
                                                 
41 Bruce W. Tuckman, “Developmental sequence in small groups,” Current Concerns (1964). 
42 Connie Gersick, “Time and Transition in Work Teams: Toward a New Model in Group 
Development,” The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Mar 1988), 16. 
43 Ibid., 17. 
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set at different points, it is important for leaders in both the working mobilization team 
and the ad hoc unit to recognize this.  Ideally, these milestones should be reached during 
pre-deployment training.  
D. MILESTONES 
Two key milestones are 1) the first moments when a unit forms and begins 
defining itself, and 2) near the midpoint of the training cycle.  During these periods, it is 
imperative that the external training units and organizations provide clear direction about 
what is required.  As LTC Woods, Commander of the 414th Civil Affairs Battalion stated 
during the first set of interviews for this project: “The first few days set the tone for our 
training and unit.  We did not know who was assigned to us, we did not know where 
everyone lived, and we did not know what the training plan entailed.  We only knew that 
we were deploying in April [2006].” 44  While this reaction is not unusual for someone in 
a newly formed organization or team, for units preparing to go into combat, this “bad 
start” has the potential to slow the learning curve for the unit as it strives to figure out 
which unique issues it feels should preoccupy its time versus what the unit should have 
been accomplishing during the first days after unit formation.  Additionally, after 
spending several days together, any attempt by outsiders aimed at “fundamentally 
altering a group … may be unsuccessful because [of] members’ resistance to perceiving 
truly different approaches.”45 
A second central milestone comes at the midpoint in the training cycle.  Most 
organizations and individuals recognize the midpoint as signifying they are halfway to 
the end.  At this critical point, it becomes imperative that everyone involved reengage the 
training design process to take advantage of the unit’s increased information and abilities 
to revise their training goals, and to adjust their training plans to the resources, timelines 
and requirements needed to ensure the unit is prepared for deployment.  If done 
                                                 
44 Lieutenant Colonel William Woods, interview with author, March 12, Fort Bragg, NC. 
45 Connie Gersick, “Time and Transition in Work Teams: Toward a New Model in Group 
Development,” The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Mar 1988), 38. 
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constructively, the collaborative process exercise can help streamline the ad hoc unit’s 
ability to perform as defined in FM 7-0, Training the Force, as shown in Figure 2. 
E.  REFINING THE ARMY TRAINING MANAGEMENT CYCLE 
The Army Training Management Cycle described in Chapter II is the core 
concept defining how the Army trains its force.  As Chapters III and IV have shown, this 
model is most effective when the timelines are sufficiently long enough and when the 
unit has the internal capabilities to plan and execute its own training regime.  For ad hoc 
units, neither of these criteria usually hold true.  
1. Reaching the Desired End State: A Validated Training Plan 
For units to succeed, they must have a validated training plan that ensures that 
correct tasks are selected and trained prior to a unit deploying.  This means units confront 
questions like whether to place most of their emphasis on force protection, cultural 
awareness, communications, or collaboration and consensus building skills?  Depending 
on the unit and its mission, all of these are valid choices.  So how do the trainers and 
headquarters choose what to prioritize?  Fortunately, many tasks are interconnected and 
may directly or indirectly support a METL task.   
Figure 5 proposes a different way to look at the input side of the training cycle 
that units face when developing their METL and training plans.   Rather than catalog 
hundreds of tasks and then try to synchronize them, a different approach would be to 
categorize the tasks as Critical, Essential or Enhancing.  Adopted from a model used by 
the Army Special Operations Command for prioritizing logistical requirements, these 
terms make it easier to begin the process of de-conflicting and prioritizing the various 







Critical Tasks:  Tasks a unit must be proficient in in order to accomplish its 
primary missions.  If these tasks are not trained, a unit will either (1) be unable to 
accomplish its defined operational missions, or (2) only be able to accomplish the 




Figure 5.   Training Plan Matrix 
 
Essential Tasks: Tasks a unit must be proficient in but which will not prevent the 
unit from accomplishing its primary missions.  If essential tasks are not trained 
there is an increased risk of mission failure but not significantly an increase risk 
of casualties or loss of equipment. 
 
Enhancing Tasks:  Tasks a unit must accomplish but that have little to no impact 
on the ability of the unit to perform its primary missions.  Inability to train 
enhancing tasks carries little to no risk of mission failure and should not result in 
casualties or loss of equipment. 
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The idea is not to replace the current system of developing a METL with its 
associated unit evaluations for task proficiency of Trained, Proficient, Untrained (TPU) 
for collective, unit and individual tasks.  Rather, the system proposed here builds on the 
current system espoused in FM 7-0 by expanding the organizational structure of the tasks 
so they are ranked based on operational necessity and risk.  For example, is performing 
dismounted land navigation a mission essential task for a unit that only conducts mounted 
patrols, or only drives within the confines of a Forward Operating Base? 
2. Inputs to the Training Plan 
a. Operational Requirements 
When developing the training plan for a unit, two overlapping phases 
guide the planning process:  the Operational Requirements phase and the Training and 
Sourcing phase.  Incorporation of each of these is crucial to ensuring that training plans 
for ad hoc units are comprehensive and address the minimum critical tasks required once 
the unit deploys.  The first phase in the training process is identification of the missions 
and requesting personnel or units to accomplish the tasks.  As part of this process, the 
most important step is the accurate communication of operational requirements from 
those defining the mission to those who are tasked to prepare units to complete the 
mission.  During the pre-deployment training, the operational requirements serve as a 
basis for determining the operational effectiveness and suitability of the unit to deploy.   
b. Training and Sourcing 
Once the operational requirements are defined, the second phase 
determines the training and sourcing needed to meet them.  In Iraq, for example, one 
critical operational requirement is for functional specialists to support the Embedded 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (E-PRT) in Baghdad (e.g., city planner or agronomist).  
These positions were specifically created to meet a specialized stabilization and 
reconstruction requirement.  The linkage between the operational requirements phase and 




determine where the specific resources exist within the military, where the requirements 
should be outsourced, or where ad hoc units are required to meet the operational 
requirements. 
c. Capabilities Analysis 
To achieve an integrated training plan requires capabilities analysis.  The overall 
goal of the capability analysis is to avoid deployment of a unit in which individuals or the 
unit either fails as whole to meet the down-range commander’s needs or fails to 
understand their overall operational objectives.  By evaluating the capabilities request in 
relation to the problem and the overall operational environment, the working team can 
tailor training to meet the downrange commander’s requirements.  It is here that there is a 
decided need for close collaboration among the working mobilization team and with the 
ad hoc unit. 
The benefits of linking the development of operational requirements with training 
and sourcing are threefold.  First, the commander in theater can be assured that the 
capabilities requested will be likely to arrive.  Second, realistic timelines for training and 
deployment can be developed.  Third, everyone will be on the same sheet of music/page 
from the outset.  For the working mobilization team meanwhile, the real benefit is that it 
can focus its training plans to make the best possible use of a limited amount of time. 
d. Collaboration Loop 
The final component of the Training Development Plan is creation of a 
dynamic collaboration loop.  Typically, after the initial training plans are validated, and 
initial lessons learned and checklists incorporated, there is minimal update of the training 
matrix to incorporate ongoing changes in theater.  This collaboration loop is different 
from the feedback loop that is defined in FM 7-0 (see Figure 1).  The goal of the 
feedback loop described in FM 7-0 is to produce internally derived information to assist a 
unit improve its own proficiency.  In the model described in Figure 5, feedback looks to 
gather all organizations involved in setting operational requirements, developing and 
validating training plans, executing training, and validating units for deployment.   
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The goal should be to not only improve the capabilities of the ad hoc unit 
preparing to deploy, but to incorporate real time issues and requirements.  What makes 
the collaboration loop unique is that it ensures the latest lessons are incorporated into 
training. 
An example of how the collaboration process could work is to look at the training 
task of how a unit provides security when a convoy stops and dismounts (at a non-traffic 
control point).  Initially, when the task list is first being developed this task might be 
classified as essential since the unit can still accomplish its overall missions without 
perfecting security procedures.  But what if, as the unit trains, it is determined in theater 
that complex attacks are increasing and the task of security should be elevated from 
essential to critical.  By creating a dynamic collaboration loop into the training analysis 
and development process, the working mobilization team would be able to incorporate 
this change into the ad hoc unit’s training. 
Though such a concept is not new and many units conduct collaboration 
informally, the overarching goal should be to formalize feedback processes and 
incorporate collaborative actions into the training development system.  The collaboration 
process does not stop after the final training plan is signed.  Up until the day the ad hoc 
unit deploys, the staff and operations section should continue to update the process 
specialization diagram, reprioritizing and making changes as required.   
F.  A REFINED TRAINING DEVELOPMENT PLAN 
With the training matrix defined, Figure 6 illustrates how a refined training 
program can be executed.  Having identified that a unit requires training prior to 
deployment, the initial steps (Steps 1 and 2) follow the standard system currently in place 
within the Army.  This entails consolidating the myriad of reference sources and training 
requirements (input sources) for the operations section of the unit tasked with conducting 
training (i.e., the working team at the mobilization station).   
After the initial tasks are mapped, the operations section then begins the process 
of distributing management for the individual processes across the staff sections within 
the working team (Step 3).  Unlike most conventional training programs, the key here is 
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to ensure that tasks are not only parsed out to the most appropriate individual or group 
within the working team, but that once responsibility is transferred, the individual or 
group retains responsibility for the tasks throughout all phases. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Training Development Plan 
In Step 4, the tasked individuals and groups (staff sections) review the tasks list 
and validate or reassess the tasks as enhancing, essential, or critical by comparing the 
tasks against their own experiences and background, established policies and standards, 
benchmarks, lessons learned and operational updates from the field.  The goal is to refine 
the operational training plan to ensure training tasks are prioritized correctly.  Once this is 
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accomplished, the individuals and groups present their revisions for concurrence. 
Appropriate changes are then made prior to execution (Step 5). 
Step 6 is less a phase than a process which needs to be continual.  The 
collaboration loop provides for constant feedback and reassessment as new information is 
gained.  The operations section is responsible for providing oversight of this looping 
process while specific individuals retain responsibility for tracking the tasks assigned to 
them.46   
In this way, by standardizing the methodology and enforcing a collaborative 
approach to training management, the work team should be able to 1) maintain a more 
up-to-date and relevant picture of the operating environment where the ad hoc unit will 
be deploying and 2) maximize its ability to manage scarce time and allocated resources.   
Lack of time, availability of resources, or a work team staff not trained to operate 
in a collaborative environment will pose challenges.  In each of these cases, it will be up 
to the work team unit commander to overcome them as best he/she can.  The overall 
intent of this proposed process is not to fix the mobilization and deployment process.  
The intent is instead to streamline the process so that ad hoc units are more capable when 
they leave the mobilization station and deploy to combat.  If this occurs, the learning and 
transition curves for the ad hoc units in theater will shrink and the units will be able to 
more quickly achieve optimum efficiency at an earlier point in the their rotation.  No 
amount of knowledge will eliminate the gap in efficiency that occurs when unit’s 
transition in theater; but this proposed concept does provide a means to lessen the impact 
of the transition and more evenly balance the operational rate in theater.  Figure 7 
illustrates the likely results. 
                                                 
46 A good example of how the collaboration loop can work is to study the initial training program 
for the FBCB2 computerized battlefield tracking system.  When the systems were first fielded, many units 
classified training on the system as critical to achieving mission success.  However, over time evidence 
indicated that the time required for training on this task was better spent on other tasks.  Thus, the task was 
downgraded from critical to essential and eventually enhancing for most units, especially those in the Army 
Reserve and National Guard.  Today, given the small number of systems available within the U.S., FBCB2 
training is barely covered during pre-deployment training in favor of conducting familiarization once a unit 
arrives in theater and begins operating on convoys and in vehicles with mounted systems.   
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Figure 7.   Revised Unit Transition vs. Effectiveness Curve 
G. FINAL STEPS 
Once the draft training plan is approved (Step 7, Figure 6), the ad hoc unit 
executes training in preparation for deployment (Step 8).  While the ad hoc unit is 
training for deployment, it is important that collaboration training occurs during the 
process.  When collaboration and team cohesion training is incorporated, the working 
unit is able to ensure that any deficiencies caused by creation of the ad hoc unit are 
overcome.47 
The final step occurs after the unit deploys and is arguably the most difficult step 
for the training unit – obtaining feedback from a deployed unit (Step 9).  If the working 
team is able to obtain a record of the experiences of the ad hoc unit after it deploys, these 
lessons learned can be easily assimilated into future training plans for other units.  The 
 
 
                                                 
47 See Chapter III.C provides a full description of possible team functioning skills that may be 
deficient when the ad hoc unit first forms. 
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difficulty with this is maintaining physical contact when both the training unit and the ad 
hoc unit are engrossed in their missions, with little time to think about the recent past or 
the distant future. 
H.  CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, a unit’s effectiveness is a function of time management, social and 
task cohesion, and use of an effective methodology to prepare the unit for deployment.  It 
is easy to redraw line and block organization charts.  It is even easier to misunderstand 
the unit’s mission and fail to accomplish the assigned specified tasks.  For real 
transformation to occur, units must be made more effective not only so they can 
accomplish their assigned tasks downrange, but so they can develop detailed plans to 
train and manage the limited time they may have to do so. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The ad hoc unit will remain an important tool in the Department of Defense’s 
arsenal.  As this thesis has shown, while ad hoc units may be considered proficient, they 
have not received the level of training and education required to ensure their success 
when deployed.  As these units proliferate, they require training beyond the basic 
technical skills of surviving on the battlefield and accomplishing the minimum skills of 
their specialty.  Team members must be able to quickly assemble, develop cohesive 
bonds and learn to properly manage the limited training time available to develop the 
team dynamics and social capital needed to be successful.  The current system of training 
within the Army meets the first criterion of preparing units to deploy; however, it does 
not satisfactorily address how to prioritize or manage the ever increasing list of needs and 
requirements that compete for time, resources and space on the training calendar. 
As noted by Lieutenant Colonel William Woods, the 414th Civil Affairs Battalion 
Commander, unified teamwork begins on “Day One; it is about understanding human 
nature and applying the correct pressure so that individuals mold to the needs of the 
team.”48  This thesis has drawn a direct correlation between the “soft skills” - the 
technical and doctrinal skills required by ad hoc units - and their usefulness within the 
context of deployment.  It is critical for ad hoc units and the units that are responsible for 
their pre-deployment training to understand how these skills operate in parallel.  Until 
this occurs, it will be difficult for ad hoc units to receive the proper training they need.  
Thus, it is incumbent on the training units to not only identify the correct training, but to 
ensure that all training is correctly prioritized, executed, and revised when appropriate. 
A.  SUMMARY QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENTS 
1. What is the largest training impact on ad hoc units during 
mobilization? 
Research conducted for this thesis indicates that the largest impact on successful 
training of ad hoc units remains the limited time the units are together prior to 
deployment.  While technical difficulties still remain such as availability of firing ranges, 
                                                 
48 Lieutenant Colonel William Woods, interview with author, February 9, 2007. 
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synchronization of individual and unit training requirements, and equipment resourcing 
during mobilization, the preponderance of problems stem from taking a disparate group 
of individuals, and in a period of weeks to a few months, transitioning them into a 
cohesive fighting unit. Chapter I and II were dedicated to discussing the organizational 
and occupational challenges faced by ad hoc units.   
What is difficult for personnel assigned to these ad hoc units to themselves 
appreciate is the criticality that each member plays within the team.  It is not until this 
realization occurs and not until each member recognizes what others bring to the ad hoc 
unit and fight that the team will gel and be able to move forward.  This is especially true 
when the ad hoc unit is joint.  To counteract the potentially disruptive effects of 
combining inter-service cultures, I propose that training development plans for ad hoc 
units include material highlighting the importance of collaboration, consensus decision-
making, and team building, along with what these require, in their curriculum and 
training plans.  If incorporated early into the training plan, before barriers to change are 
erected by individuals, there is a greater opportunity to decrease natural skepticism and 
distrust and promote better appreciation for each other’s backgrounds and experiences. 
 
2. To what extent is the body of literature pertaining to team 
effectiveness applicable to the training and validation ad hoc units for 
deployment? 
 
Over the past forty years, dozens of research studies and articles have been 
written on team effectiveness and cohesion.  Chapters I, II, and III drew on a considerable 
body of literature that links leadership and team cohesion to effectiveness. Much of this 
research is based on specific case studies of companies, organizations, and events where 
collaboration and efficiency were measured and metrics of success defined.  But there has 
been little effort to standardize measurable variables of team effectiveness. Additionally, 
the means to evaluate the individuals’ influences on team effectiveness has not been 
documented in relation to the overall effectiveness of the team.   
In the case of military deployments, this lack of research is compounded by the 
absolute speed at which operations move in relation to the speed at which doctrinal 
development can keep pace in today’s combat environment.  A clear example of this can 
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be found in the field of Civil Affairs itself.  Prior to issuance of Field Manual 3-05.40, 
Civil Affairs Operations, in September 2006, the last Field Manual published was 41-10 
in February 2000.  Between these two publication dates, the entire Civil Affairs 
community in the Army and Marine Corps deployed to war and the force structure 
became so strained that the DoD deployed non-Civil Affairs personnel as augmentees. 
The challenge with such a high rate of deployments is that forces deploy and 
tactics change so frequently that lessons learned are not easily captured.  More 
importantly, entire units deploy and conduct operations based on limited doctrine and 
maximum personal experience.  This was evident in every unit studied for this thesis.  
Ironically, responding to the environment is a key concept in Civil Affairs, as is 
collaborating with partners and understanding the nature of psychological and 
sociological responses to diverse challenges.  This now needs to be applied by Civil 
Affairs and the broader community to the ad hoc units we field. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the results of this study, the following recommendations suggest 
themselves: 
 
1. The DoD should relook at training programs for ad hoc units and treat the 
cognitive requirements for team development on a par with meeting technical 
training requirements. 
2. Both ad hoc unit training and units tasked with training ad hoc units should 
include concepts and skills related to collaboration, consensus decision-
making, and team building in their curricula and training plans. 
3. Ad hoc units should receive additional special attention in the realm of 
building cohesion; there is a need to speed up the process of building mutual 
professional and social respect. 
4. A revised training matrix should be developed that prioritizes tasks according 
to a system of Critical, Essential and Enhancing tasks. 
5. A new Training Development Plan (as described in Figure 6, page 60) should 
be implemented by units tasked to train ad hoc or any other deploying unit. 
6. Incorporation of a collaboration loop should be added to the Training 
Management Plan to speed timely review of requirements against the most 
recent information. 
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7. Training units should expand their knowledge base to incorporate the 
immediate and short-range feedback from deployed units. 
8. The Army Research Institute should commission future studies to see if the 




9. The Army Research Institute should commission further studies to focus not 
only on the training process and unit effectiveness when deployed; they 
should also look at the effects of post-deployment adjoining after the unit has 
completed its assigned mission. 
 
Finally, in the uncertain and complex environment that currently exists for 
training and validating units, especially, ad hoc units, for deployment, a more collective 
strategy is needed to maximize the effectiveness of the limited time available to train 
units.  Further research on effective performance of units during periods of transition in 
the context of relief in place and when unit boundaries are changed when units are 
deployed should be performed.  Answers to survey questions varied widely regarding the 
loss of time and overall operational efficiency during these two types of events.  
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APPENDIX A: CASE STUDY: PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION 
TEAMS IN IRAQ49 
A. OVERVIEW 
The latest model in stabilization and reconstruction is the use of the Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT) to coordinate and oversee the transition and reconstruction 
programs in a post-conflict environment.  A major program created jointly by the 
Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of State (DoS), these interagency teams 
seek to improve reconstruction efforts by combining a variety of disciplines to form 
working teams to study and implement policies that foster long-term growth.  In Iraq, 
specifically, the United States Government (USG) has used the PRT to spearhead its 
reconstruction efforts.  While there exists a growing body of literature and much 
“wisdom of practice” on the use of interagency teams to manage reconstruction, there 
remains limited scientific understanding of how group dynamics and organization drives 
cohesive teamwork and hastens the transition to host nation capacity.  To advance  
scientific knowledge about interagency collaboration and the development of cohesive 
teams, this study analyzes the case of Army Civil Affairs units supporting the PRTs in 
Iraq.  The analysis is intended to help understand and ultimately design and implement 
new ways to facilitate collaborative processes that influence the quality and efficiency of 
reconstruction programs. 
                                                 
49 The data used to generate this case study was gathered during the period October 2006 to March 
2007.   
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1. Overview of Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
The concept of the PRT was first incorporated into operations in Afghanistan in 
2002 and expanded into Iraq in October 2005.  The PRTs were created to expand the 
capacity of the Government of Iraq (GOI) to deliver not only essential services but also to 
help establish a permanent mid-level bureaucracy that is able to meet the short- and long-
term needs of the Iraqi population.  The PRT process is bottom-up driven with oversight 
provided by a combined DoD and DoS team located within the U.S. embassy in 
Baghdad. Figure 8 shows the location of the current and future PRTs in Iraq.  
 
Figure 8.   Location of Iraq PRTs. (From: Department of State, January 2007) 
As Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice put it in January 2007, PRTs help local 
and provincial governments “manage the day to day problems of the people where the 
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people live.”50.  PRT funds are focused on training and coordination versus the typical 
reconstruction role of building physical infrastructure.  The mission of the PRTs in Iraq is 
to: 
 
(1) Have stabilized, transparent processes for identifying redevelopment needs 
throughout the assigned provinces, and a solid program to address redevelopment. 
(2) Have regularized mechanisms for citizen participation in the governmental 
decision-making processes. 
(3) Have increased core competencies in the areas of public administration, finance 
and budgeting, and urban/municipal planning and accountability. 
(4) Have enhanced reporting and assessment on political and economic development 
at the local level, and advocacy of coalition political and economic policy goals. 
(5) Foster stability and security throughout their provinces.51  
 
As part of President Bush’s plans to expand operations in Iraq, the number of 
PRTs was expanded in 2007 from 10 to 19 and eventually 21.   
2.  Organizational Development 
PRTs are designed to strengthen the capacity of local Iraqi leaders to build an 
economically viable, politically moderate government.  By leveraging the Iraqi business 
community, local leadership, and elected officials, the PRTs target assistance versus 
overall nation building.  Some examples of PRT programs include leadership and 
business training seminars and short courses, micro-loan and micro-grant programs, and 
bureaucratic mentoring programs. 
To accomplish these tasks, PRTs are composed of American and coalition 
Foreign Service officers, military specialists and security teams, U.S. interagency experts 
                                                 
50 Stephen Kaufman, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams Building Local Iraqi Leadership,”  
http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2007/January/20070117180624esnamfuak0.9784815.html 
(Accessed January 17, 2007). 
51 U.S. Department of State Cable 04045, Action Plan to Build Capacity and Sustainability within 
Iraq’s Provincial Governments, U.S. Mission Baghdad and Multinational Forces – Iraq (2005), 3-4. 
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from the Departments of Agriculture, Justice and State, U.S. Aid for International 
Development (USAID), and functional specialists in areas like agriculture, municipal 
planning, accounting, and rule of law.  While some organizations in Iraq manage 
reconstruction projects and funding, PRTs are instead organized to use their limited 
funding mechanisms to build Iraqi capacity versus complete physical projects. Both by 
design and execution, PRTs are ad hoc organizations composed of individuals brought 
together only for the specific mission of supporting the PRT.  As such, building and 
executing operations as a team is difficult at best. 
3.  An Integrated Theory on Teamwork 
Teamwork begins, and each participant brings to the team a network of ideas, 
representing the individual’s prior knowledge relevant to the groups’ task.  Each 
individual brings with him/her thought patterns and knowledge that are characteristic of 
the organization, culture and community to which that member belongs.  Because some 
individuals have common backgrounds (including their broader institutional context), 
they share ideas to some degree with other members.  These overlapping ideas constitute 
the group’s task-relevant shared knowledge.  Also, each individual possesses task-
relevant private knowledge that is not known by other members and that may or may not 
be shared with others in the organization. 
As the team becomes more cohesive, members of the group share and discuss 
some of their ideas about the mission and develop a coordinated vision.  During team 
development, group members attempt to develop compatible mental models pertaining to 
the team and their tasks.  Since there are multiple agencies represented within each PRT, 
building shared task and team models requires each individual to negotiate language, 
definitions, and procedures to ensure an amicable working environment.  Even terms held 
in common, such as reconstruction, and short- and long-term reconstruction, must be 
clarified and redefined.  For example, USAID and the DoS believe long-term 
development is a five to seven year process while the DoD views long-term development 
as a nine to twelve month process. 
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One critical challenge to PRT formation is when one organization becomes a 
dominant force behind policy making; this could be when DoD has to take the active lead 
because DoS and USAID are unable to fill their billets or when DoS pushes DoD aside 
because it feels the area is permissive and DoD is hindering reconstruction activities.  In 
the worst case, this may lead to creation of in-group/out-group splits. To overcome these 
challenges, teams should train ahead of time and learn about the various attributes of the 
cultures represented on the team.  It is important for teams to recognize the key external 
actors that will impact team operations, and information about them should be 
incorporated into any training.  Understanding these challenges leads to a more 
compatible understanding of the overall mission and how the team can most effectively 
work together while retaining the unique disciplinary knowledge each brings to the table. 
Ultimately, as units begin to coalesce into a team, they will go through multiple 
developmental phases that are characterized by the use of different means of 
communication.  What is important is for the leadership forming the PRTs to recognize 
the divergent skill sets and belief systems that each organization brings to the overall 
organization and then develop training plans to ensure they address not only the common 
areas but also the differences in culture and belief. 
B. DATA SOURCE, CONTEXT, AND ANALYSIS 
1.  Contextual History 
During OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM ROATION 06-08 (2006 to 2007), three 
Army Civil Affairs units were tasked to provide tactical support to four PRTs in Iraq.  
During the first two months together, the unit members spent most of their time 
becoming acquainted and struggling to define a systematic plan for supporting the PRT 
effort in Iraq.  Unit members with more experience in the systemic functions of Civil 
Affairs provided some mentoring but a constant turnover of personnel and a fragmented 
training plan meant that as the units deployed from the United States to Iraq they still had 
no clear vision or plan for support.  After transitioning with the units rotating out, the 
three companies assumed their role as augmentations to the PRTs. 
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Forty days into the rotation in Iraq, the units had developed basic mission plans 
and were integrating into the daily rhythm of the PRTs.  Sixty days into the rotation the 
Civil Affairs units were accomplishing their security mission, but the majority still had 
difficulty defining the primary PRT missions.  Even at four months after the initial 
deployment of the units, most unit members continued to express a need for further 
information and material about overall requirements and initiatives needed to make the 
PRTs successful.  In short, this initial four month period could be characterized as an 
apprenticeship phase of team development.  
This matches the basic concept presented in the main thesis that incoming units 
face a learning curve of several months before they are able to achieve the efficiency of 
the previous rotation. 
2. Transforming Ideas into Action 
The challenge for the PRTs is that the majority of their capability is mental not 
capital output.  Therefore, in order for the team to have greater effectiveness with the 
Iraqi government, the team must develop ways to transfer its knowledge on 
reconstruction to the GOI.  There are multiple ways this can occur.  First, as the PRTs 
currently operate, they can hold meetings and training sessions with the GOI, directing 
them on how to build sustainability and then use follow-up meetings to emphasize the 
importance of executing certain tasks.  For example, the PRT might arrange for an 
agriculture seminar and later leverage the information gained to force the district 
governor to implement needed farm reform programs.  Alternatively, the PRT might 
accumulate information from various sources within the province and present an overall 
package to the GOI for implementation. For example, the PRT might conduct weekly 
meetings with local farm groups and agriculture interests and capture the results of this 
into a single action plan.  Once this action plan is completed it would be presented to the 
local district manager for approval and implementation. 
Observation of the three PRTs found that both techniques were widely used to 
develop and convey programs to the Iraqis.  Observation over the length of the 
deployment showed that units which seemed most effective were able to track the 
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incoming data and develop a key list of tasks to perform.  From there, they were then able 
to take this content, develop a product for the Iraqis, and based on the Iraqi response; 
influence the direction in which the reconstruction program was headed.  A significant 
negative for all the units was that the military Civil Affairs component of the PRT had 
not trained with its civilian counterparts.  As a result, the time it took to develop cohesion 
within the overall PRT was extended.    
Two examples of how transforming ideas into products worked are the Ninewa 
and Baquba PRTs.  At the Ninewa PRT outside Mosul, the PRT was very effective at 
achieving a team approach to reconstruction. By using intermediary products and 
analyzing accumulated data from three previous years of stabilization efforts, the team 
leader and assistant positively influenced the direction and facilitated the work of the 
team.  The Baquba PRT appeared effective, but staff shortages and over-zealous team 
members led to the PRT bogging down in its overall efforts.  While the Baquba PRT was 
able to focus heavily on economics and microfinance it was unable to create a viable 
political structure over the first years of the PRTs existence. 
3. The Action-Item List: A Product of Distributed Processing 
Recent research in the civilian world on groups has highlighted the importance of 
role definitions as a catalyst for increased unit productivity.  Issues associated with 
defining the roles of team members can also affect group morale.  Given the importance 
of this issue, it was curious to note that team composition and role discussion primarily 
occurred only during the formative time frame in the first two months after the units were 
created back in the United States.  Though unit reorganization did occur during the 
deployment, an overarching review of team cohesion and staffing was never made after 
the units fell in on their PRTs.   
The first organizational meetings for the Civil Affairs support to the PRTs 
occurred in March 2006 when the units were thrown together at Fort Bragg.  Unit 
manning rosters were initially determined based on alphabetical lists regardless of skill 
sets or past civilian or military experiences.52  In each case, the senior battalion 
                                                 
52 Command Sergeant Major Robert Zglenski, interview with author, March 14, 2006. 
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commander interviewed each officer and made a leadership decision.  In three cases, the 
decision was made to place an average officer in the leadership role despite evidence that 
there might be problems once the units deployed.53 
As a result of the unit organizational method, there was continued concern 
throughout the entire training cycle into the first thirty days of the rotation in Iraq 
regarding teams’ roles.  However, once the units deployed, the speed of activity on the 
ground led to a decision not to make wholesale changes in organization.  During 
interviews with units in June 2006, the units appeared to remain concerned and in some 
cases confused about their roles supporting the PRTs.  Given the importance of defining 
roles for team members, one has to wonder why this was not considered an item for 
further action. 
4. Challenges Faced by the PRT 
a.  Reconstruction or Transition? 
The overall efforts of the PRTs were consistently hampered by a failure at 
all levels of command, both within the military and civilian worlds.  The initial cause for 
this failure developed prior to the PRT concept being imported to Iraq from Afghanistan.  
Specifically, the lead problem for the PRTs begins with their name.  The word 
“provincial” is appropriate given that most nations divide their internal boundaries by 
province.  However, the way that the words “reconstruction” and “team” were defined 
has consistently led to a misapplication and worse, a misunderstanding, of the capabilities 
and mission as defined by the DoS and DoD. 
The word “reconstruction” signifies first and foremost that a country has 
viable physical infrastructure and capital that can be rebuilt.  In Iraq this is not the case.  
Ten years of sanctions and over thirty years of dictatorial rule had left much of Iraq 
unprepared for Iraqis to assume the political and economic responsibilities of overseeing 
reconstruction in 2003.  So, when the subject of reconstruction arose, especially in the 
United States, the initial assumption was that the country was in a minor downturn, but 
                                                 
53 Lieutenant Colonel William Woods, interview with author, March 13,  2006. 
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not destitute.  A better suited title would be “transition.”  Transition signifies a continual 
process of transferring control and program management.  More importantly, “transition” 
denotes a process or means to achieve a desired end state such as reconstruction. 
The third word, “team,” was also a misnomer.  When the PRTs were first 
created in Afghanistan, the concept was to centralize reconstruction efforts around a core 
group of military members and augment them with functional specialists from other U.S. 
Government agencies.  In Iraq, the same concept was floated, but with the civilian 
interagency running the PRT and the military filling a support role.  What was missing 
from both PRT concepts was the host-nation participation.  If the overall end state is to 
transition political and economic development programs to the GOI, then it is critical to 
involve the Iraq bureaucracy in the transition team.  So, for “team” to mean what is 
should, more GOI involvement in the PRT is required. 
b.  Doctrine and Training 
A challenge with ad hoc teams such as PRTs is developing basic 
organization doctrine about how to operate.  This can be as simple as a standardized 
operations and training manual.  But the difficulty in translating doctrine to daily 
operations involves more.  In Trust, Piotr Sztompka demonstrates that how a team 
translates levels of trust is critical to the projected success of the team.   Doctrine, 
therefore, must look past the lists of training tasks and study the structural context of not 
only how the team is organized and operates but also how the team operates, within the 
context of the Iraqi society.  “Understanding stability, transparency and accountability of 
institutions is a critical mediating process,” Sztompka writes.  “In addition collective 
capital (human and social) of the members of a [team] provides potential resources for 
taking risks”.54  
For doctrine to succeed in reconstruction and within the PRTs, it must 
recognize/acknowledge that there is a reciprocal relationship between trust and 
 
 
                                                 
54 Piotr Sztompka, Trust (London: Cambridge Press, 1999), 34. 
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democracy.  For example, studies have shown that when there is an underlying fear of 
moving backward in a newly democratic country this is usually directly related to distrust 
of the stability of new institutions. 
Historically, there has been little “doctrine” for PRTs.  Since each is an ad 
hoc organization, both the DoS and DoD have left it to each PRT commander to 
determine the best methodology to reconstruct his or her piece of Iraq.  According to 
LTC Joseph Staton at the National Coordination Team (NCT), “this has been one of the 
problems to overcome – giving the PRT commanders too much latitude in designing, 
staffing and executing their missions”. 55  So, how might the PRTs develop “swift trust” 
in an environment where teams are created at the last minute and individual team 
members do not know each other until the day the team is created?  Two methods suggest 
themselves. 
First, the PRTs must develop a common goal or vision, starting small to 
demonstrate organizational trust and establish both internal and external credibility and 
capability.  By setting a sense of urgency defined by detailed boundary conditions (e.g., 
political and economic indicators of success), the team can then begin finding common 
ground among members and with their projected Iraqi counterparts.  Most importantly, 
the team must act and be professional; as the old adage goes: first impressions are lasting 
impressions.  By learning how to balance individual vs. team requirements and by 
demonstrating a competency and willingness to work, teams have a greater chance of 
success.  Further, PRTs that are able to meet these objectives are more likely to react to 
change (e..g, mission, personnel) better than those that are rigid and individually focused. 
Second, PRTs should adopt a holistic approach to the reconstruction 
effort.  A good template for success is the model for post-conflict reconstruction 
developed by Sultan Barakat of the University of York.  Barakat defines seven basic 
components required for long-term sustainable development.  Barakat has empirically 
shown that when these components, listed below, are executed with a participating 
                                                 
55 Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Stanton, interview with author, February 22, 2007. 
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indigenous population’s participation and targeted at economic, social, political and 
psychological systems, the probability for sustaining reconstruction success increases.56 
 
 Vision: synthesizing the views of multiple organizations and groups, 
including local nationals, on essential medium term goals. 
 Participation: ensuring the internal, in addition to external, resources 
are leveraged.  It is critical psychologically that the local population 
becomes a vested partner in the development of social policies and 
political policies that are sustainable within their culture versus what is 
thought sustainable by external actors. 
 Security:  providing for a secure environment through policing with 
focus not on protecting foreign personnel but on restoring conditions 
of general security that allow the local population to work and carry on 
lives without fear of peril. 
 Reconciliation and Justice: establishing trust in the national and 
provincial governments by creating a system based on the rule of law 
based on a commitment of righting wrongs and achieving an 
acceptable level of social justice and accountability. 
 Equity: creating an economic and political development plan that 
addresses not only the equity between various secular groups in Iraq 
but also the impacts that reconstruction economic policy will have on 
the country as a whole (e.g., supporting date production through 
micro-loans while failing to provide external markets at the macro 
level). 
 Reconstruction and Development : understanding that reconstruction is 
different from development only due to complexity of the process, 
such as added emotion, reconciliation, and solving ingrained 
differences 
                                                 
56 Sultan Barakat, After the Conflict: Reconstruction, and Redevelopment in the Aftermath of War 
(London: IB Taurus, 2005), Chapter 14. 
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 Capacity:  knowing how to use the survival abilities of the Iraqis 
because the methods used, often informal and collaborative structures, 
are potentially capable of supporting of the development of local 
institutions vital to rebuilding.57 
 
The overarching tenet of Barakat’s After the Conflict is that the 
development process should carry more weight than should the physical execution, 
especially in the early stages of a post-conflict operation.  Further, though the 
international community is generally honorable, many times reconstruction is initiated by 
inappropriately pouring large sums of money into incorrectly identified infrastructure 
rebuilding, corrupt institutions, and large expatriate salaries.  Instead of focusing efforts 
on the purely technical aspect of rebuilding the physical environment, a clearer vision is 
required which “helps the population recover – economically, socially, politically, and 
psychologically.”58 In over four years of post-invasion reconstruction in Iraq, these basic 
concepts remain unfulfilled.  Even the fifteen months of PRTs in Iraq have produced little 
realistic proof that current reconstruction efforts are providing for a better Iraq. 
Most detrimental to efforts in Iraq has been that little attention is still paid 
to relating reconstruction to how the government of Iraq and the Iraqi people want to 
develop their society.  As espoused by Barakat, the challenge for the coalition in Iraq is to 
get past the physical destruction and apparent lack of formal organization and realize that 
Iraqi reconstruction is as political as the war itself, and that reconstruction, especially 
when dealing with social and political engineering, is fraught with risk. 59  
c. Organizational Design and Sourcing 
A major challenge of the PRTs is balancing the military and civil capacity.  
Currently, the primary role of the military is to provide (1) force protection support and 
(2) augment the reconstruction efforts by providing Civil Affairs personnel.  The reality 
                                                 
57 Ibid, 249-270. 
58 Ibid., 74. 
59 Ibid., 149. 
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is that the military Civil Affairs personnel have taken on much of the reconstruction 
workload in areas that were semi- and non-permissive due to a lack of interagency 
personnel willing to accept the high risk environment. 
This has led to a non-standardized list of capabilities as each PRT has 
capitalized on the individual civilian skill sets the civil affair personnel serendipitously 
bring to the table.  For example, in Baquba, four of the PRT members were stock brokers 
or work in the finance industry in civilian life.  As a result, the Baquba PRT and Diyala 
Province had the highest record of approved micro-finance loans in Iraq.60  In Ninewa 
the civilian expertise was focused on justice and public safety, and in Salah ad Din  
Province, the focus has been on infrastructure enhancements in Samarra and Tikrit.61 
The cause of the mismatch in unit capabilities is traceable to the process of 
sourcing personnel to fill the Civil Affairs or other similar ad hoc units.  Unlike 
individual augmentees, the Civil Affairs teams are autonomous units.  When the Army 
ran out of organic personnel to staff its units, these units reverted to joint control for 
sourcing of personnel.  As a result, each service is now required to provide a percentage 
of unit fill as directed by Joint Forces Command. And since the sourcing documents only 
list rank and basic job description requirements, it is left to each service to determine who 
to place in each unit vacancy.  
A second sourcing challenge is that the new embedded PRTs required 
over 129 civilians to manage the functional specialist positions.62  These positions were 
initially filled with military reservists mobilized for up to one year, with the positions 
eventually filled with USG or private contractors.  The main problem with this approach 
was twofold.  First, it took on average six to seven months to become a respected and 
accepted member in the Iraqi business culture.  Since the military stopgap was only 
scheduled to last for eight to nine months, there was a strong possibility that the military 
specialists would not be effective at reaching out and gaining acceptance by the GOI.  
                                                 
60 Mr. Reed Whitlock, interview with author, February 4, 2007. 
61 Mr. Joe Shroader, interview with author, February 5, 2007. 
62 Ibid. 
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Second, contractors, though potentially cost effective, were driven by corporate balance 
sheets and not diplomacy.  As a result, an additional stovepipe for command and control 
(i.e., the contractor internal business organization) had to be placed on top of an already 
overly bureaucratic PRT structure.63 
Finally, the current organizational design of the PRTs was stifling 
progress as a result of the decision to create overlapping requirements and responsibilities 
for each of the interagency partnerships.  Each interagency functional specialist had two 
reporting chains of command.  First, functional specialists reported to the PRT lead from 
the DoS.  However, since they are only attached to the PRT from the embassy, each 
specialist also retained a secondary chain of command to his/her normal agency lead in-
theater.  The result of this decentralized and multi-dimensional reporting structure was 
increased inefficiencies when the actions of the PRT conflicted with those of the senior 
representatives in Baghdad. 
d.  Operations Stand Alone PRTs 
Operationally, the PRTs are designed to help rebuild a provincial area by 
providing technical assistance to the Government of Iraq (GOI). In reality, the PRTs are 
limited to work in the ten major cities in Iraq and do not impact the surrounding 
provincial areas except through the provincial councils.  The causes of this are four-fold.  
First, the security situation in most of the PRT locations remains semi- to non-permissive.  
Therefore, the PRT specialists and team members cannot easily get to areas other than the 
primary cities. Second, the PRT remain under the ultimate direction of the embassy in 
Baghdad whose primary focus is the ten city economic development plan implemented in 
June 2006.  The goal of this program is to channel the majority of the reconstruction 
efforts into the primary population centers vice spreading the capacity throughout the 




                                                 
63 Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Stanton, interview with author, February 22, 2007. 
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their fullest capacity.  Fourth, the Civil Affairs teams assigned to the PRT overlap 
responsibilities with the civil affair units assigned to the combat brigades located in the 
same regions.64 
The Civil Affairs personnel assigned to the PRTs were divided into two 
groups.  The first group, the functional specialists, provided a stopgap in areas such as 
municipal planning, economics, and governance until the interagency players were able 
to staff their requirements.  The second and more controversial group was the Civil 
Affairs tactical company assigned to each PRT.  Like the functional specialists, these 
personnel were usually thrown into specialist roles.  For example, in Diyala Province, 
because of the civilian jobs of some of the Civil Affairs personnel, they became 
instrumental in the micro-loan program in the region.65  More importantly, the Civil 
Affairs personnel were usually used for force protection and support to the main PRT 
efforts in the cities and did not use the skill sets on which they were trained. 
A glaring operational gap within the PRTs was that the Civil Affairs teams 
were not used to perform the role of civil reconnaissance.  As discussed before, since the 
PRTs main focus is on the central cities of Iraq, the surrounding areas in the provinces 
generally received little reconstruction assistance.  A better alternative would have been 
to use the Civil Affairs units to assist at this local level and leave the functional 
specialists assigned to the PRTs to manage the provincial issues, along with USAID and 
DoS personnel.66  The chief benefit of this mission change would be to get the Civil 
Affairs units back into their primary tactical role.  
Tactical Civil Affairs do not have the overall capacity to rebuild structural 
systems at the provincial level in semi-developed and developed countries like Iraq.  
Instead, they should work at the local level gathering data and making rudimentary 
analyses of the effectiveness of the reconstruction efforts outside of the main cities.  The 
 
 
                                                 
64 Lieutenant Colonel Otto Busher, interview with author, June 9, 2006. 
65 Major Hanhauser and Major Foster, interview with author, June16, 2006. 
66 Lieutenant Commander Carlos Iglesias, interview with author, February 3, 2007. 
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chief benefits of this are that 1) the Civil Affairs units become more visible and effective 
when working with both the Iraqis and the military units in the region, and 2) the PRT is 
able to extend its reach past the city-centers.67 
Additionally, re-orienting the Civil Affairs mission would alleviate some 
of the friction that occurs between the Civil Affairs units assigned to the PRTs and the 
combat maneuver brigades.  With the exception of Mosul, which has a permissive 
security situation, the majority of the Civil Affairs units assigned to PRTs did not work 
well with the maneuver Civil Affair units.68  The failure mainly resulted from turf battles, 
different mission directives, and leadership conflicts.  By taking the PRT Civil Affairs 
units and turning their mission into a primarily civil reconnaissance role, they would be 
forced to work more closely with the maneuver brigade Civil Affairs assets for security 
and information.  This, in turn, could increase the collaboration between the PRTs and 
the combat forces in a province, thus providing a clearer vision to the reconstruction 
effort. 
e. Embedded PRTs 
In Baghdad the newly embedded PRTs faced an additional set of 
challenges.  The basic concept of the embedded PRTs is illustrated in Figure 9.  Baghdad 
was initially divided into ten brigade sectors and within each sector was a series of Joint 
Security Stations (JSS).69  Each JSS served as the equivalent of local policing and was 
manned by American, Iraqi Police and Iraqi Army personnel who lived and worked in the 
sector.  Concurrent with the stand-up of the JSS, six embedded PRTs were created to 
assist the brigades with the reconstruction mission.   
                                                 
67 Lieutenant Commander Carlos Iglesias, interview with author, February 3, 2007. 
68 Enlisted and NCOs Salah ad Din  PRT, interview with author, February 5, 2006 and officers, 
Kirkuk PRT,  interview with author, February 6, 2006. 
69 Ambassador Joseph Saloom, interview with author, January 27, 2007.  As the program developed 
the number of JSS per BCT sector increased. 
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Figure 9.   Embedded PRT and Joint Security Station Concept. 
The key to the embedded PRTs was that the leadership was integrated into 
the brigade staff functions and served as a key component of the staff planning and 
execution process.  Four issues helped define whether the embedded PRTs were 
successful when implemented between April and December 2007. 
First, the original embedded PRT concept was predicated on only six 
brigades in Baghdad.  When the number of brigades increased to ten, there was not a 
realignment of the PRTs to create an additional four.  The result is that some embedded 
PRTs provided coverage to two brigades, making it more difficult to be relevant in the 
daily operational plan.  During interviews in February 2007, the National Coordination 
Team agreed that this was a challenge, but the NCT and MNCI C9 did not have plans to 
alter the implementation concept.70  Ultimately the Brigade Commanders made the 
situation work, but not without much trial and effort.  
                                                 
70 Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Stanton, interview with author, February 22, 2007. 
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Second, the staffing of the embedded PRTs was truly ad hoc.  The core 
leadership first reported to Baghdad by 31 March 2007.  This included the senior PRT 
team leader from the DoS, the senior USAID, senior Civil Affairs planner, and an Iraqi 
who was part of the bilingual, bicultural advisor group.  They linked with the brigade(s) 
they were supporting and began an assessment process of all activities done since March 
2003.  Their goal was to develop a reconstruction plan ready for implementation when 
the second phase of the deployment occurred in mid-summer.  The second phase included 
129 military functional specialists drawn from across the entire Army Reserve, but not 
necessarily with any Civil Affairs or stability and reconstruction experience.  Like the 
stand alone PRTs, the military functional specialist’s role was to be an interim fill until 
fiscal year 2008 when the DoS budgeted money to support the embedded PRTs.71  The 
challenge for the embedded PRTs was that the leadership, which received very limited 
training by DoS, and the main team members were never given a chance to build a 
cohesive unit prior to deploying.  While this concept eventually worked, it continued the 
debate started in 2003 concerning the value and ability of individuals to guide 
reconstruction versus team efforts.72 
Third, the embedded PRTs derived most of their funding through the 
Commander’s Emergency Relief Program (CERP) program.  Designed to be a rapid 
reaction program, CERP has turned into the primary means for brigade commanders to 
influence the security posture within their sectors.  A challenge for the embedded PRTs 
was overcoming the institutional bias of the military to focus monies on programs 
supporting force protection and realign them against reconstruction.  This leads to the 
fourth and most complex challenge: mindset. 
The embedded PRT concept was rife with stovepipes and individual 
command and control challenges.  For example, while the PRT team chief was overtly 
responsible for all members of his/her team, the reality is that each interagency player 
and the military had their own directives that may or may not have conflicted with those 
of the team chief.  This stovepipe system was a carryover of the creation of the CPA from  
                                                 
71 Ambassador Joseph Saloom, interview with author, January 27,  2007. 
72 Ibid. 
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2003 when neither the embassy nor the military were given ultimate control of 
reconstruction activities.  As a result, the priorities set by each agency (e.g., DoS, DOJ, 
USAID, Department of Agriculture (DoA)) could trump the individual plans of the PRT 
chief.73 
Additionally, the military and interagency players applied different 
definitions to short-, medium-, and long-term.  To the military, short- to long-term occurs 
within a year—the time the unit is on the ground in Iraq.  To the interagency contingent, 
short-term programs end at one year, and long-term stretches to seven to ten years.  For 
the embedded PRTs to succeed, the two groups had to spend inordinate amounts of time 
to reach a consensus across all of Baghdad. 
Ultimately, the embedded PRTs achieved the desired results. However, the 
lack of pre-deployment planning and focus on team development placed large hurdles in 
the path to success.  Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), as the primary source provider for 
the PRTs, should take a more active role in developing accurate requirements and 
consolidated training.  While new training units put in place since 2006 exist for PRT 
personnel prior to deployment, it remains imperative that the senior DoS and DoD 
leadership in Iraq spends more time coordinating the implementation of reconstruction 
activities at the tactical level. 
f. Deployment Timelines 
Historically, the deployment timelines for the PRTs were not synchronized 
to either the interagency timelines or, in the case of the new embedded PRTs, to the 
combat maneuver unit the PRT was supporting.  The failure to link the stabilization and 
reconstruction efforts to the main fight resulted in a lack of detailed coordination between 
the PRTs and the maneuver commanders who “own the territory.”74  For PRTs to 
become successful, they must train and deploy not only as complete units themselves, but 
also as 
 
                                                 
73 Lieutenant Colonel Otto Busher, interview with author, June 9, 2006. 
74 Major Menzemer, interview with author, February 6, 2007. 
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internal assets of the supported maneuver commander.  Until this happens, there will 
continue to be opportunities for disconnects between the military commander and the 
civilian PRT lead.   
In the case of the new embedded PRTs this problem was exacerbated 
because the main “surge” operations occurred over seven weeks before the first of the 
PRT leadership arrived in the maneuver brigade headquarters to set up reconstruction 
operations.  Additionally, the main body of the new PRTs, the functional specialists, did 
not arrive until June 2007, almost four months into the new surge.  Though it can be 
argued that the situation must be more permissive for the functional specialists to be 
effective, they still required time to acclimate and become familiar with operations on the 
ground.  As a result, the new embedded PRTs were not fully operational until almost six 
months into the surge. 
C. A MATRIX FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
One mechanism to reduce the number of challenges facing the PRTs is to review 
how the PRTs are integrated into military operations.  From the outset, planning 
development should focus on using the PRTs as one facet of the overall reconstruction 
effort.  Figure 3 illustrates a proposed methodology for using PRTs in future combat 
operations.  As indicated in the figure, the role of the PRT changes from reconstruction 
and capacity building to transitioning between civilian-military run operations to 
assumption of core bureaucratic functions by the host nation.  Since the mission is no 
longer restricted to reconstruction operations and focuses instead on transition, the most 
important change is to rename the PRTs to Provincial Transition Teams (PTT).  By 
accomplishing this, the linkage between reconstruction operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq becomes more visible, and more importantly, the linkage to the Department of 





Figure 10.   Core Transition Program from Military through Civilian to Host Nation 
Control.  
 
The overall concept for the proposed PTT is to use the core principles defined in 
earlier of this thesis (doctrine and training) to create a thorough development plan which 
integrates a central vision with a strong host nation presence in the reconstruction effort.  
Three critical components of this process are (1) integration of host nation personnel 
directly into the PTT, (2) eventual handoff of the PTT to the host nation once 
reconstruction operations are complete, and (3) realignment of tactical Civil Affairs 
teams’ priorities during each operational phase. 
Currently, no PRTs integrate host nation personnel into the daily operations.  
Instead, the PRT members travel from their base camp to meetings with the host nation, 
hold training courses with the host nation for the host nation personnel, and issue 
directives and provide international linkages to assist host nation personnel with 
reconstruction activities.  Under the new concept this would change.  The basic premise 
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is that the provincial leadership requires trained bureaucrats and the best way to create 
them is through a process of formal education, on-the-job training, and mentoring.  To 
achieve this, the new PTT would begin integrating host nation personnel into the teams 
once the environment moves from combat operations to stabilization.   
There are three primary benefits with this integration process.  First, the host 
nation personnel receive daily contact with the functional experts of the PTT; they are 
able to learn through mentoring.  Second, the PTT is able to gage the effectiveness of the 
newly minted host nation bureaucrats against set metrics.  By working with these 
personnel daily, the PTTs ability to accurately assess the status of SSTR efforts is 
increased.  Third, the host nation is better able to convey the cultural nuances about Iraqi 
society that are lost when the military and civilian members return to their base camps 
each day, after only a couple hours of perfunctory meetings. 
The second advantage of the redesign is that there is a defined end-state when the 
host nation is capable of assuming political and economic control of its province.  This 
currently does not exist within the PRT structure.  Instead, there are individual metrics 
derived by the NCT for each PRT and briefed monthly.  Status is measured by achieving 
standardized levels of reconstruction as defined by Baghdad.  For provincial 
reconstruction to succeed, this process must transition to the provincial level (unless a 
centralized government is the ultimate intent).  By adding the host nation handoff, the 
local population visibly sees the train when it enters the tunnel and knows exactly where 
the end of the tunnel is.  The process becomes a closed loop system that requires host 
nation collaboration and feedback. 
The third attribute of the PTT is that Civil Affairs tactical and operational units 
receive clearer guidance on what their mission entails prior to arriving in theater.  
Historically, the units have arrived with little knowledge of where the reconstruction 
process stood.  By clearly defining the expected operations the units will face, it becomes 
easier to develop detailed training plans to validate units prior to deployment.  When 
successful, the process eliminates the hundreds of extraneous training tasks and focuses 
efforts on exactly what is required.  Further, refining the mission tasks gives the 
supported unit commander or PTT team leader a better understanding of what to expect 
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from his/her Civil Affairs support.  PTT leaders are then able to project gaps in their 
reconstruction plans and more efficiently use the resources available. 
Regardless of nomenclature, the design of the PRT must change to reflect the 
long-term vision of reconstruction.  Allowing sourcing decisions and internal bickering to 
determine how to source, fund, and execute operations has meant the current PRTs are 
not able to adequately meet the goals that are defined in their overall mission statement.  
Only after a full review of the PRT structure from bottom to top occurs will the PRTs 
become effective and meet the overall intent to “have stabilized, transparent processes for 
identifying redevelopment needs throughout the assigned provinces, and a solid program 
to address redevelopment issues.”75 
The PRT concept is now seven years old and has survived initial contact in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  However, there remains a mindset across the USG that PRTs are 
inherently different in Afghanistan and Iraq.  The reality is that they are more similar than 
different as long as the central goal of each is to transition from military-civilian control 
of reconstruction to host nation control of the government.  But also, as long as this 
assumption of difference exists, the lessons learned in both places cannot be incorporated 
into a standardized plan of action regarding reconstruction and development in post-
conflict environments.   
D. CONCLUSION 
In summary, there are six areas the USG must concentrate on for successful 
implementation of the PRT concept.  They are not listed in order of precedence, but each 
is critical to understanding and implementing reconstruction efficiently and effectively: 
 
• Understanding cultural issues above the basics of dos and don’ts. 
• Creating and implementing a central versus distributed vision. 
• Integrating indigenous personnel as integral members of a PRT. 
                                                 
75 Major Johnny Spruiel, interview with author, February 9, 2007. 
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• Placing the PRT into the bigger operational picture versus implementing PRTs 
in parallel to military and other reconstruction efforts (e.g., USAID programs). 
• Defining solutions holistically versus as city-centric. 
• Standardizing training, doctrine, and operations in the joint, interagency, and 
multinational environment. 
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APPENDIX B:  SURVEY SUMMARY 
A. SAMPLE DESIGN 
The research for this thesis was conducted over a 14 month period from March 
2006 through May 2007.  During that time, four discrete interview series were conducted 
with eight Civil Affairs units deploying to Iraq in support of OPERATION IRAQI 
FREEDOM, Rotation 06 – 08.  The units included six, 32-member tactical Civil Affairs 
companies and two, 47-member battalion headquarters companies for a total sample size 
of approximately 298.   
The units were pre-selected in November 2005 prior to decisions by the United 
States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command on unit composition 
or deployment location. Each discrete interview series was a combination of three types 
of interviews: individual, group and survey.   
The interview schedule and number of participants for each company in the study 
group are included in Tables B-1 through B-4 below.  Overall, over 200 hours of taped 
interviews, 70 group interviews, 159 individual interviews, and 667 questionnaires (1 
declined to participate in the survey) were completed during the effort.   Additional 
interviews were conducted throughout the period with personnel who worked with, 
trained, or influenced operations of the eight units in the study group.  A list of personnel 
interviewed is included in Appendix C. 
  94
Table 1.   Initial Interview Series, 3 – 14 Mar 2006, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.  
 
Number of Interviewees Unit Location 
Group Individual Survey 
Headquarters, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion 3 11 14
A Company, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion 3 3 14
B Company, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion 3 2 14
C Company, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion 3 5 18
Headquarters, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion 2 4 29
A Company, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion 3 3 14
B Company, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion 3 3 14




Total  23 33 142
 
Table 2.  Second Interview Series, 30 Mar – 7 Apr 2006, Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina. 
Number of Interviewees Unit Location 
Group Individual Survey
Headquarters, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion 2 7 34
A Company, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion 2 4 22
B Company, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion 2 2 19
C Company, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion 3 3 22
Headquarters, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion 2 8 2
A Company, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion 1 3 29
B Company, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion 1 2 22




Total  15 31 177
 
Table 3. Third Interview Series, 1 Jun – 19 Jun 2006, Iraq (Various Locations). 
Number of Interviewees Unit Location 
Group Individual Survey
Headquarters, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion 3 8 23
A Company, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion 1 3 14
B Company, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion 2 2 17
C Company, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion 2 5 23
Headquarters, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion 5 9 31
A Company, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion 0 2 1
B Company, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion 2 3 25
C Company, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion 
Iraq 
2 2 16
Total  17 34 150
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Table 4.  Fourth Interview Series, 24 Feb – 13 Mar 2007, Iraq (Various Locations). 
Number of Interviewees Unit Location 
Group Individual Survey
Headquarters, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion 2 13 35
A Company, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion 1 5 18
B Company, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion 2 6 21
C Company, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion 2 6 25
Headquarters, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion 3 17 32
A Company, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion 2 2 19
B Company, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion 2 8 25
C Company, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion 
Iraq 
1 4 22
Total  15 61 197
 
B.  SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
Demographic characteristics of the sample, like personnel strength in each unit, 
varied over time as personnel rotated in and out of the units.  Table B-3 summarizes the 
characteristics during the period in which the surveys were taken and do not necessarily 
represent the composition of the unit in the weeks before or after the survey.  The data are 
based on personnel who completed the physical survey and are presented on an 












Table 5.  Demographic Characteristics of the Sample. 
Number Category 
Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 Survey 4 
Potential Sample 
Size 
238 298 296 287
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C.  INTERVIEWING PROCEDURES 
1. Group Interviews. 
Group interviews were conducted using two different methods.  During the first 
two series of interviews at Fort Bragg, NC, I was able to meet with small groups of 
service members.  The groups were ideally broken down into enlisted (E4 and below), 
NCO (E5 to E8), and officer.  In a few cases, this was not possible due to time and unit 
movement constraints.  When this occurred, only two groups were interviewed: (1) 
enlisted and NCO, and (2) officer. 
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The third and fourth interviews were more difficult since the units were deployed 
in Iraq and stationed at multiple locations.  In many case, units themselves were further 
sub-divided and located in areas not at the primary unit location.  Therefore, group 
interviews for the third and fourth series of interviews were generally mixed officer, 
NCO, and enlisted.  When possible, groups were separated, but this was the exception 
and not the rule.  Two units were able to maintain separation throughout the entire study 
period: C/414 CA BN and B/402 CA BN. 
2. Individual Interviews 
Individual interviews occurred when available.  Two types of interviews occurred 
during the study.  The first group of interviews was with service members assigned to the 
units in the study group:  commanders, senior NCOs, and critical staff and operations 
personnel who could provide detailed descriptions on unit activities and effectiveness.  
The second group of interviews included personnel who trained, worked with, or came in 
contact with the study group.  Examples of these personnel include the 1st Warrior 
Training Brigade at Fort Bragg, the Division G9 and Corps MNCI C9 staff cells, the 
354th CA Brigade, and interagency personnel assigned to Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams supported by study group units. 
3. Questionnaire 
As part of the research effort, a comprehensive survey was conducted of 
personnel assigned to the study group.  The survey remained consistent throughout the 
study and was given during each of the primary interview sessions (two at Fort Bragg and 
two in Iraq).  The surveys were conducted anonymously in order to obtain a more 
realistic response.  The first two surveys were conducted using hard copy surveys that 
were later converted to electronic files.  The last two surveys were done using the Survey 
Monkey software suite.  In the second set, interviewees answered the questions directly 
into a computer database. The flow of the questionnaire follows:  
 Basic deployment history 
 Thoughts about current deployment 
 Personal opinions 
 Perception of your current Civil Affairs unit 
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 Perception of training and deployment in civil affairs 
 Perception of the working environment in your Civil Affairs unit 
 Demographics 
4. Survey Results 
The following series of tables summarize the information gained during the study, 
broken down by question.  There were a total of 89 questions in the overall questionnaire.  
Though the questionnaires can be broken down by individual unit, the presentation of 
data in this Appendix is aggregated across the entire study group. 
1. What statement best describes your status? 
 
Number of Responses 
Question / Answer Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 Survey 4
I am assigned to USACAPOC as a USAR 
Soldier 72 90 73 87
I am assigned to USACAPOC as a U.S. 
Army Active Component Soldier 0 0 0 0
I am attached to Civil Affairs from the 
U.S. Navy Reserve 14 6 5 8
I am attached to Civil Affairs from the 
U.S. Navy 14 18 13 14
I am attached to Civil Affairs from the 
U.S. Air Force Reserve 0 0 0 1
I am attached to Civil Affairs from the 
U.S. Air Force 6 1 1 4
I am attached to Civil Affairs from the 
Army Individual Ready Reserve 32 49 34 48
Other (please specify) 4 13 19 24
Skipped the question 0 0 5 11
Total 142 177 150 197
 
2. If you are in the Reserves or National Guard were you a volunteer for this rotation? 
 
Number of Responses 
Question / Answer Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 Survey 4
Yes 49 65 57 62
No 78 106 86 109
Skipped the question 15 0 7 26
Total 142 177 150 197
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3. If you are in the Reserves or National Guard and volunteered what were the primary 
factors that led you to volunteer?  Pick as many as are relevant or add any that are not 
listed. 
 
Number of Responses 
Question / Answer Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 Survey 4
Duty / patriotism to country 33 43 10 34
Duty / patriotism to unit or team 25 13 11 14
Excitement 25 3 7 4
Monetary reward 4 8 7 7
Experience 9 6 12 16
Other (please specify) 22 104 100 114
Skipped the question 24 0 3 8
Total 142 177 150 197
 
4. Describe your current deployment history since 9/11.  For the Reserves and National 
Guard deployment is defined as mobilized from the civilian status placed on active 
duty orders for greater than six months to serve in an operational assignment either 
overseas or in the United States and demobilized back to your civilian status.  For 
active duty deployment is defined as deploying downrange (overseas) for at least four 
months in an operational assignment in support of the Global War on Terrorism. 
 
Number of Responses 
Question / Answer Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 Survey 4
I have completed a deployment supporting 
the Global War on Terrorism within the 
last 12 months. 
10 8 4 11
I have completed a deployment supporting 
the Global War on Terrorism more than 12 
months and less than 24 months ago. 
12 16 6 8
I have completed a deployment supporting 
the Global War on Terrorism more than 24 
months and less than 60 months ago. 
24 23 20 29
I completed a deployment supporting the 
Global War on Terrorism more than 60 
months ago. 
5 9 5 9
I have never deployed in support of the 
Global War on Terrorism before this 
mobilization. 
91 121 111 132
Skipped the question 0 0 4 8
Total 142 177 150 197
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5. How much notice were you given to report to your new unit for this current 
deployment? 
 
Number of Responses 
Question / Answer Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 Survey 4
More than 90 days notice prior to 
deploying 19 28 22 18
60 to 90 days notice prior to deploying 16 17 15 15
30 to 59 days notice prior to deploying 51 55 45 73
Less than 30 days notice prior to deploying 54 77 64 83
Skipped the question 2 0 4 8
Total 142 177 150 197
 
6. How satisfied are you that you did what you need to prepare for deployment? 
 
Number of Responses 
Question / Answer Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 Survey 4
Completely satisfied 7 3 3 4
Pretty satisfied 66 49 34 23
Not very satisfied 69 122 109 162
Skipped the question 0 3 4 8
Total 142 177 150 197
 
7. Thoughts on your current deployment.  The questionnaire asked the respondent to 
their satisfaction on a scale of 1 to 6 as follows: 1 – Strongly Disagree, 2 – Slightly 
Disagree, 3 – Neither, 4 – Slightly Agree, 5 – Strongly Agree, or 6 – N/A. The 
average result is listed in the table below. 
 
Number of Responses 
Question / Answer Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 Survey 4
I feel comfortable deploying in a Civil 
Affairs unit? 3.40 3.11 3.18 3.00
Deployment predictability is important to 
me. 4.32 4.14 4.17 4.43
I understand how the mobilization and 
deployment system works. 3.45 3.33 3.59 3.57
My deployed unit can take on nearly any 
task and complete it. 3.37 3.25 3.34 3.01
I am thinking of trying to become fulltime 
military after this deployment. 2.80 2.52 2.96 2.00
My work-groups overall level of 
effectiveness is very high. 3.31 3.25 3.32 3.44
I am happy with my deployed team’s level 
of commitment to the mission. 3.78 3.78 3.86 3.36
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Number of Responses 
Question / Answer Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 Survey 4
I think I will be in the military five years 
from now. 3.38 3.09 3.12 2.72
I will leave the military as soon as I am 
able to separate. 2.56 2.79 3.04 2.72
The quality of the personnel I work with 
meets my expectations for accomplishing 
the CA missions. 
3.62 3.52 3.41 2.68
In general I like working for the military. 4.25 3.93 4.18 3.8
Supporting the overall war effort is 
important to me. 4.52 4.29 4.14 4.24
If members of our deployed team have 
personal problems or concerns everyone 
wants to help out so we can get back 
together again. 
3.79 4.01 3.69 3.18
Members of my unit are willing to share 
information with other team members 
about our work. 
3.94 4.02 3.48 3.31
I would be very happy to spend the rest of 
my career with the military. 3.43 3.00 3.33 2.66
I feel anxious about working with members 
of other teams. 3.13 3.17 2.83 2.59
I have worked in joint units before. 2.87 2.99 3.57 3.16
I feel emotionally attached to my deploying 
unit. 3.02 3.21 3.07 2.62
I feel like a part of the deploying unit’s 
family (for example my dependents are 
incorporated into the Family Readiness 
Program). 
2.67 2.71 2.37 2.04
Deploying outside my normal military 
career field is hurting my chances for 
advancement. 
2.64 2.67 2.84 2.36
I often feel the strain of trying to balance 
my military responsibilities and family. 3.09 3.24 2.86 3.42
Tension exists trying to balance my 
deployments and personal life. 3.26 3.36 3.00 3.59
My family dislikes me deploying. 3.81 3.85 3.76 3.95
My family understands my responsibilities 
to the military. 4.14 4.11 4.14 4.05




8. Individual Feelings on Unit Composition.  Rate the importance of these personal issues 
to you as an individual.  The questionnaire asked the respondent to their satisfaction on a 
scale of 1 to 7 as follows: 1 – Not At All, 2 – Very Little, 3 – Little, 4 – Somewhat, 5 – 
Moderately, 6 – Greatly, or 7 – A lot.   The average result is listed in the table below. 
Number of Responses 
Question / Answer Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 Survey 4
Feedback from others? 5.17 4.77 5.00 4.67
Appreciation? 4.98 4.79 4.83 4.76
Opportunity to take time off when needed? 5.31 5.03 4.69 4.64
Sharing of duties? 5.17 4.95 4.93 4.72
Sharing of responsibility? 5.18 5.04 5.21 4.59
Emotional support? 5.01 4.54 3.90 4.38
Skipped the question 0 0 4 8
 
9. Rate the following questions based on your perception of your current Civil Affairs 
unit in accomplishing its Civil Affairs missions. The questionnaire asked the 
respondent to their satisfaction on a scale of 1 to 6 as follows: 1 – Strongly Disagree, 
2 – Slightly Disagree, 3 – Neither, 4 – Slightly Agree, 5 – Strongly Agree, or 6 – 
N/A. The average result is listed in the table below. 
 
Number of Responses 
Question / Answer Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 Survey 4
Working as a member of a Civil Affairs 
unit has increased my ability to perform 
efficiently at assigned tasks. 
3.19 3.05 2.93 2.96
I generally like working as part of this 
Civil Affairs unit. 3.59 3.43 3.17 2.96
I have confidence that my unit can 
perform effectively. 3.64 3.55 3.14 3.08
My deployed unit has a lot of team spirit. 3.73 3.77 3.03 2.76
Being in my unit gives me the opportunity 
to support the overall war effort. 4.16 3.91 3.31 3.39
I often think about quitting my job with 
the military. 2.49 2.76 2.76 2.89
When needed members of my unit help 
each other out. 4.06 4.05 3.55 3.42
Members of our deployed team stick 
together outside of work time. 3.54 3.92 3.66 3.07
Members of my unit cooperate to get the 
mission accomplished. 4.01 4.11 3.93 3.5
The thought of this deployment 
worries/worried me. 3.21 3.32 2.76 3.14
I am concerned with how I will fit in with 
the team. 2.87 2.81 2.24 2.37
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Number of Responses 
Question / Answer Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 Survey 4
My leadership cares about me personally. 3.59 3.65 3.52 2.88
My leadership cares about me 
professionally. 3.64 3.68 3.52 2.87
My leadership is concerned with 
ensuring my family is taken care of while 
I am deployed. 
3.40 3.30 3.31 2.43
Skipped the question 0 0 4 8
 
10. Rate the following questions based on your perception of the training and deployment 
of your current Civil Affairs unit. The questionnaire asked the respondent to their 
satisfaction on a scale of 1 to 6 as follows: 1 – Strongly Disagree, 2 – Slightly 
Disagree, 3 – Neither, 4 – Slightly Agree, 5 – Strongly Agree, or 6 – N/A. The 
average result is listed in the table below. 
 
Number of Responses 
Question / Answer Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 Survey 4
I think the current training plan 
effectively prepared my unit to conduct 
its mission in Iraq. 
2.29 1.73 2.00 1.38
I think the current training plan to deploy 
as a unit is better than deploying as 
individual augmentees to other units 
already in Iraq. 
3.74 3.46 2.97 3.29
Overall I like the way Civil Affairs has 
implemented the training and 
deployment plan. 
2.32 1.79 1.83 1.53
I feel better if I deploy with individuals 
from my old unit. 3.79 3.58 3.59 3.51
All in all I am satisfied with my job. 3.41 3.25 3.28 2.93
I feel better if I deploy with individuals 
from my own service or branch of service. 3.54 3.53 3.34 3.45
Compared to other units I have been 
associated with the effectiveness of my 
current unit is excellent. 
2.93 3.19 2.69 2.53
Skipped the question 0 0 4 8
 
 
11. Rate the following questions based on your perception of the working environment in 
your current Civil Affairs unit.  The questionnaire asked the respondent to their 
satisfaction on a scale of 1 to 6 as follows: 1 – Strongly Disagree, 2 – Slightly 
Disagree, 3 – Neither, 4 – Slightly Agree, 5 – Strongly Agree, or 6 – N/A. The 
average result is listed in the table below. 
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Number of Responses 
Question / Answer Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 Survey 4
If given the choice I would prefer to work 
at the tactical level (going into the field 
frequently). 
3.81 3.81 3.69 3.75
If given the choice I would prefer to work 
at the operational and functional specialist 
level (working in a base camp with limited 
to no trips outside the gate). 
2.50 2.50 2.52 2.28
I feel a strong sense of belonging to my 
deploying unit. 3.49 3.40 3.14 2.71
If given the choice I would prefer to work 
at the strategic level or somewhere outside 
the combat zone. 
2.63 2.60 2.48 2.43
I think deploying outside my 
service/branch is justified in wartime. 3.57 3.53 3.66 3.54
I like the people in my unit. 4.11 4.17 4.00 3.39
I find I have to work harder at my job 
because of the leadership problems 
within my unit. 
2.67 2.90 3.24 3.37
There is too much bickering and fighting 
within my unit during the deployment. 2.34 2.53 3.21 3.36
My unit leadership is competent in doing 
their job. 3.76 3.54 3.17 2.79
Based on your Civil Affairs training 
completed to date you understand what the 
Civil Affairs mission in Iraq requires you 
to accomplish? 
3.54 3.10 3.07 2.95
My unit leadership was unfair to me. 1.87 2.02 1.86 2.46
My unit leadership showed too little 
interest in the feelings of subordinates 
within my unit. 
2.26 2.28 2.21 2.83
I like my unit leadership. 3.77 3.68 3.45 2.92
Our deployed team is united in trying to 
succeed. 4.02 4.04 3.93 3.3
Our deployed team members have 
conflicting aspirations for the team’s 
performance. 
2.64 2.67 3.14 3.24
The deployed team provides me 
opportunities to improve my personal 
performance. 
3.70 3.54 3.55 3.21
Our deployed team members rarely 
socialize together. 2.57 2.25 2.38 2.7
Our deployed team would rather go out on 
their own than get together as a team. 2.55 2.47 2.69 2.97
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Number of Responses 
Question / Answer Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 Survey 4
This deployed unit is one of the most 
important social groups to which I belong. 2.88 2.93 2.66 2.16
I would consider being part of this type 
of deploying unit in the future. 3.21 2.95 2.79 2.42
Some of my best friends are on this 
deployed team. 2.40 2.64 2.90 2.38
I am going to miss the members of my 
unit when this deployment ends. 3.46 3.52 3.72 3.04
I have problems working with others on 
deployments. 1.78 1.95 1.83 1.96
If members of our deployed teams have 
professional problems or concerns 
everyone wants to help out so we can get 
back together again. 
3.62 3.68 3.55 2.93
I avoid extra duties and responsibilities 
within the deployment. 1.83 1.86 1.97 1.88
My unit was very effective on the 
deployment. 3.18 3.05 2.97 2.87
All in all my unit was very competent. 3.37 3.27 3.34 2.89
In my estimation our unit gets the job done 
effectively. 3.59 3.52 3.24 3.14
Skipped the question 0 0 4 8
 
12. Taking all things together how would you describe your preparations for deployment? 
Number of Responses 
Question / Answer Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 Survey 4
Very Happy 10 7 2 0
Pretty Happy 62 52 22 38
Not too Happy 70 118 123 146
Skipped the question 0 0 3 13
Total 142 177 150 197
 
13. If you mobilized as an individual and were assigned to a Civil Affairs team after 
arrival how long did it take you to feel as if you were part of the unit? 
Number of Responses 
Question / Answer Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 Survey 4
Less than 7 days 29 31 13 32
7 to 15 days 18 33 16 25
16 to 30 days 20 26 14 24
31 to 60 days 17 27 37 36
61 to 90 days 28 35 44 49
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I never felt a part of the deployed team 30 25 18 23
Skipped the question 0 0 8 8
Total 142 177 150 197
D. DEVIATIONS 
A number of deviations in the survey sampling occurred over the length of the study 
duration.  These events are summarized below. 
 
1. Four U.S. Army Reserve Soldiers assigned to the study group were killed in 
action.  Two soldiers were assigned to the Individual Ready Reserve prior to 
mobilization and two were assigned to USACAPOC Army Reserve units.  All 
four Soldiers took part in the first three surveys but not in the fourth. 
 
2. Two Soldiers were wounded in action, evacuated, and did not participate in the 
fourth survey. 
 
3. Approximately 27 Soldiers were transferred into or out of the survey group at 
various times throughout the survey.  The two primary causes for these transfers 
were reassignment to other units outside of the study group and reassignment to 
other units within the study group.  In a small number of cases, less than five, 
Soldiers were transferred into study group units. 
 
4. U.S. Air Force (USAF) personnel assigned to the study group deployed on a six 
month versus one year rotation cycle.  Therefore, the initial five USAF personnel 
assigned to the study group units were only present for the first three interviews.  
The fourth interview was conducted with the replacement personnel. 
 
5. Unit gaps occurred during the interviews at Fort Bragg prior to unit deployment.  
This occurred because unit personnel were assigned to professional certification 
or qualification schools at the time of the interviews and were not present at Fort 
Bragg for duty. 
 
6. Unit gaps occurred during interviews in Iraq.  These were primarily due to two 
reasons.  First, a number of individuals were not present for duty (e.g., leave) at 
the time of the interviews.  Second, a number of teams were moved to remote 
bases as part of the overall operational plan in Iraq.  In many of these cases, it was 










APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW LIST 
Appendix C contains a listing of all unpublished interviews conducted during the 
course of the research.  It is categorized by date and location.  Specific citations used 
during writing of the thesis are incorporated as footnotes in the report. 
 
Table 6.  List of Interviews. 
Date Interviewee Location 
January 11, 2006 Captain Bethany Aragon, United States 
Army Civil Affairs and Psychological 
Operations Command, G3 
Fort Bragg, NC 
March 13, 2006 Major General Herbert Altshuler, 
Commander, USACAPOC(A) 
Fort Bragg NC 
March 13, 2006 Colonel Rose, Commander, Warrior 
Training Brigade 
Fort Bragg, NC 
March 13, 2006 Lieutenant Colonel William Woods, 
Commander, 414 Civil Affairs 
Battalion 
Fort Bragg, NC 
March 13, 2006 Major Chris Oswalt, Operations 
Directorate, Warrior Training Brigade 
Fort Bragg, NC 
March 13, 2006 Command Sergeant Major Terry Davis, 
Command Sergeant Major, 402 Civil 
Affairs Battalion 
Fort Bragg, NC 
March 13, 2006 Lieutenant Colonel Goto, Chief of 
Operations, USACAPOC(A) 
Fort Bragg, NC 
March 14, 2006 Command Sergeant Robert Zglenski, 
Command Sergeant Major, 414 Civil 
Affairs Battalion 
Fort Bragg, NC 
March 14, 2006 Group interview with enlisted and 
NCOs, A/414 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Fort Bragg, NC 
March 14, 2006 Group interview with officers, A/414 
Civil Affairs Battalion 
Fort Bragg, NC 
March 14, 2006 Group interview with enlisted and 
NCOs, B/414 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Fort Bragg, NC 
March 14, 2006 Group interview with officers, B/414 
Civil Affairs Battalion 
Fort Bragg, NC 
March 14, 2006 Group interview with NCOs, HQ/414 
Civil Affairs Battalion 
Fort Bragg, NC 
March 14, 2006 Group interview with officers, HQ/414 
Civil Affairs Battalion 
Fort Bragg, NC 
March 15, 2006 Group interview with enlisted and 
NCOs, C/414 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Fort Bragg, NC 
March 15, 2006 Lieutenant Colonel William Mason, Fort Bragg, NC 
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Date Interviewee Location 
Commander, 402 Civil Affairs 
Battalion 
March 15, 2006 Group interview with officers, C/414 
Civil Affairs Battalion 
Fort Bragg, NC 
March 15, 2006 Group interview with enlisted, HQ/414 
Civil Affairs Battalion 
Fort Bragg, NC 
March 15, 2006 Group interview with enlisted and 
NCOs, B/402 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Fort Bragg, NC 
March 15, 2006 Group interview with officers, B/402 
Civil Affairs Battalion 
Fort Bragg, NC 
March 15, 2006 Group interview with NCOs, HQ/402 
Civil Affairs Battalion 
Fort Bragg, NC 
March 16, 2006 Group interview with enlisted and 
NCOs, C/402 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Fort Bragg, NC 
March 16, 2006 Group interview with officers, C/402 
Civil Affairs Battalion 
Fort Bragg, NC 
March 16, 2006 Group interview with enlisted and 
NCOs, B/402 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Fort Bragg, NC 
March 16, 2006 Group interview with officers, B/402 
Civil Affairs Battalion 
Fort Bragg, NC 
March 16, 2006 Group interview with officers, HQ/402 
Civil Affairs Battalion 
Fort Bragg, NC 
March 17, 2006 Colonel Rose, Commander, Warrior 
Training Brigade 
Fort Bragg, NC 
April 25, 2006 Major General Herbert Altshuler, 
Commander, USACAPOC(A) 
Fort Bragg, NC 
June 4, 2006 Petty Officer Foose, G9 NCO, 4th 
Infantry Division (414 Civil Affairs 
Battalion) 
Camp Liberty, Iraq 
June 5, 2006 Chief Petty Officer Flanick, G9 
NCOIC, 4th Infantry Division (414 
Civil Affairs Battalion) 
Camp Liberty, Iraq 
June 5, 2006 Lieutenant Colonel Lopez, Multi-
National Division-North LNO and 
Captain Serra, Multi Multi-National 
Brigade-Baghadad LNO 
Camp Victory, Iraq 
June 5, 2006 Lieutenant Colonel Alberto Rivera, 
Multi-National Corps-Iraq C9 Plans, 
354 Civil Affairs Brigade 
Camp Victory, Iraq 
June 5, 2006 Captain (USN) William Hampton, 
MNCI C9 Economics Officer, 354 
Civil Affairs Brigade 
Camp Victory, Iraq 
June 5, 2006 Colonel Baker, MNCI C9 Rule of Law 
Officer, 354 Civil Affairs Brigade 
Camp Victory, Iraq 
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Date Interviewee Location 
June 5, 2006 Captain Deitch (USAF), Deputy Public 
Affairs G9, 4th Infantry Division 
Camp Victory, Iraq 
June 5, 2006 Sergeant First Class Curtis Allen, 
MNCI C9 (Automation) 
Camp Victory, Iraq 
June 6, 2006 Lieutenant Commander Robert Koch, 
S3, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Liberty, Iraq 
June 6, 2006 Captain Duane Butler, HHC 
Commander, 414 Civil Affairs 
Battalion 
Camp Liberty, Iraq 
June 6, 2006 Mr. John McKenna, 126th Military 
History Detachment 
Camp Liberty, Iraq 
June 6, 2006 Lieutenant Colonel Parsons, 
Psychiatrist, 883rd Combat Stress 
Detachment 
Camp Liberty, Iraq 
June 6, 2006 Major Cooper, 30th Medical Brigade 
(Combat Stress) 
Camp Liberty, Iraq 
June 6, 2006 Lieutenant Isaac Kraushaiar, 414 Civil 
Affairs Battalion 
Camp Liberty, Iraq 
June 6, 2006 Major Ray Reidel, MNCI C9, 354 Civil 
Affairs Brigade 
Camp Victory, Iraq 
June 6, 2006 Lieutenant Colonel Alberto Rivera, 
Multi-National Corps-Iraq C9 Plans, 
354 Civil Affairs Brigade 
Camp Victory, Iraq 
June 6, 2006 Ms. Jennifer Link, USAID LNO to 
MNCI C9 
Camp Victory, Iraq 
June 6, 2006 Captain (USN) William Hampton, 
MNCI C9 Economics Officer, 354 
Civil Affairs Brigade 
Camp Victory, Iraq 
June 7, 2006 Lieutenant Commander Robert Koch, 
S3, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Liberty, Iraq 
June 7, 2006 Lieutenant Colonel Adrian Bogart, G9, 
4th Infantry Division 
Camp Liberty, Iraq 
June 7, 2006 Group interview with enlisted and 
NCOs, HHC/414 Civil Affairs 
Battalion 
Camp Liberty, Iraq 
June 7, 2006 Group interview with officers, 
HHC/414 Civil Affairs Battalion  
Camp Liberty, Iraq 
June 7, 2006 Lieutenant Colonel Kukla, Deputy G9, 
4th Infantry Division (Individual 
Augmentee) 
Camp Liberty, Iraq 
June 7, 2006 Group interview with enlisted and 
NCOs, S1, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Liberty, Iraq 
June 7, 2006 Group interview with enlisted and 
NCOs, A/414 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Loyalty, Iraq 
  110
Date Interviewee Location 
June 7, 2006 Lieutenant Colonel Robert Savers, 
Chief of Operations C9, MNCI 
Camp Victory, Iraq 
June 8, 2006 Group interview with officers, A/414 
Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Loyalty, Iraq 
June 8, 2006 Major Philip McIntyre, Commander, 
A/414 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Loyalty, Iraq 
June 8, 2006 Major Workman Britt, S9, 4/101 Air 
Assault Division 
Camp Loyalty, Iraq 
June 9, 2006 Group interview with enlisted and 
NCOs, C/414 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Falcon, Iraq 
June 9, 2006 Major Joliat, S9, 2/4 Infantry Division Camp Falcon, Iraq 
June 9, 2006 Major David Sigmund, MNCI PSYOP 
IO Chief 
U.S. Embassy, Green 
Zone, Baghdad, Iraq 
June 9, 2006 Major Mingo and Lieutenant Colonel 
Otto Busher, PRT- Baghdad 
U.S. Embassy, Green 
Zone, Baghdad, Iraq 
June 10, 2006 Group interview with officers, C/414 
Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Falcon, Iraq 
June 10, 2006 Captain Erickson, CATA Team Leader, 
B/414 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Falcon, Iraq 
June 10, 2006 Group interview with officers, B/414 
Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Taji, Iraq 
June 10, 2006 Major Jose Acosta, S9, 4/4 Infantry 
Division 
Camp Taji, Iraq 
June 11, 2006 Staff Sergeant McGuire, B/414 Civil 
Affairs Battalion 
Camp Taji, Iraq 
June 11, 2006 Group interview with enlisted and 
NCOs, B/414 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Taji, Iraq 
June 11, 2006 Major Robert Frander (Commander) 
and First Sergeant Stockinger, B/414 
Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Taji, Iraq 
June 12, 2006 Group interview with officers and 
NCOs, G9 (HHC/402 Civil Affairs 
Battalion) 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
June 13, 2006 Group interview of enlisted and NCOs 
from Headquarters Company, 402 Civil 
Affairs Battalion 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
June 13, 2006 Specialist Lazar, Headquarters 
Company, 402 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
June 13, 2006 Group interview with enlisted and 
NCOs, S1, HQ/402 Civil Affairs 
Battalion 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
June 13,2006 Captain Reppenger, S1, HQ/402 Civil 
Affairs Battalion 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
June 13, 2006 Ensign Gardipee, S4, HQ/402 Civil Camp Speicher, Iraq 
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Date Interviewee Location 
Affairs Battalion 
June 13, 2006 Group interview with officers, B/402 
Civil Affairs Battalion (PRT – Salah ad 
Din ) 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
June 13, 2006 Group interview with enlisted and 
NCOs, B/402 Civil Affairs Battalion 
(PRT – Salah ad Din ) 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
June 13, 2006 Commander (USN) Keesler, RROC 
Team Chief, HQ/402 Civil Affairs 
Battalion 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
June 14, 2006 Quartermaster Machinist Mate Second 
Class Michael Pollard, Headquarters 
Company, 402 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
June 14, 2006 Lieutenant Colonel James McKnight, 
G9, 101 Air Assault Division 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
June 14, 2006 Master Sergeant Luis Juan, G9 NCOIC, 
101 Air Assault Division 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
June 14, 2006 Group interview with officers from 
Headquarters, 402nd Civil Affairs 
Battalion (S-3 Operations and S6) 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
June 14, 2006 Group interview with S4 staff, HQ/402 
Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
June 14, 2006 Group interview of enlisted and NCOs 
from C/402 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Kirkuk, Iraq 
June 14, 2006 Group interview with officers, C/402 
Civil Affairs Battalion 
Kirkuk, Iraq 
June 14, 2006 Captain Jim Becker, Commander, 
C/402 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Kirkuk, Iraq 
June 15, 2006 Group interview of enlisted and NCOs, 
A/402 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
June 15, 2006 Group interview with officers, A/402 
Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
June 15, 2006 Ms Stephanie Miley, Department of 
State, Saleh ah Din Provincial 
Reconstruction Team 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
June 15, 2006 Group interview with enlisted and 
NCOs from Bravo Company, 402 Civil 
Affairs Battalion 
Camp Warhorse, Iraq 
June 15, 2006 Group interview with officers from 
Bravo Company, 402 Civil Affairs 
Battalion 
Camp Warhorse, Iraq 
June 16, 2006 Ms. Kiki Munshi, Department of State, 
Baquba Provincial Reconstruction 
Team 
Camp Warhorse, Iraq 
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Date Interviewee Location 
June 16, 2006 Mr Reed Whitlock, Department of 
State, Baquba Provincial 
Reconstruction Team 
Camp Warhorse, Iraq 
June 16, 2006 Major Hanhauser and Major Foster, 2nd 
Brigade, 4th Infantry Division S9 office 
Camp Warhorse, Iraq 
June 17, 2006 Lieutenant Colonel William Mason, 
Commander, 402 Civil Affairs 
Battalion 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
June 17, 2006 Lieutenant Colonel James McKnight, 
G9, 101 Air Assault Division 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
June 17, 2006 Captain (USN) Dever, Chief of Plans, 
MNCI C9 
Kirkuk, Iraq 
June 18, 2006 Colonel John Ward, MNCI C9 Camp Victory, Iraq 
June 20, 2006 Colonel John Ward, MNCI C9 Camp Victory, Iraq 
June 20, 2006 Lieutenant Robertson, MNCI C9 Camp Victory, Iraq 
June 20, 2006 Captain Harold Morris, MNCI C3 Camp Victory, Iraq 
June 21, 2006 Lieutenant Adrian Bogart, G9, 101 Air 
Assault Division 
Camp Liberty, Iraq 
June 22, 2006 Lieutenant Painter, Deputy G4, 4th 
Infantry Division 
Camp Liberty, Iraq 
June 22, 2006 Captain Tom DeKeiser, JSOTF-AP Camp Victory, Iraq 
June 23, 2006 Captain Neujeck, S-4, 414 Civil Affairs 
Battalion 
Camp Liberty, Iraq 
January 25, 2007 Group interview with LTC Woods, 
CDR McGinn, CSM and Zglenski, 
Command Group, 414 Civil Affairs 
Battalion 
Camp Liberty, Iraq 
January 26, 2007 Captain David Lowe, S-1, 414 Civil 
Affairs Battalion 
Camp Liberty, Iraq 
January 26, 2007 Command Sergeant Major Robert 
Zglenski, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Liberty, Iraq 
January 26, 2007 Colonel William Kehrer, MNCI C9 Camp Victory, Iraq 
January 27, 2007 Lieutenant Colonel William Woods, 
414 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Liberty, Iraq 
January 27, 2007 Group interview with enlisted and 
NCOs, Headquarters Company, 414 
Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Liberty, Iraq 
January 27, 2007 Ambassador Joseph Saloom, Director 
Iraq Reconstruction Office (IRMO) 
Green Zone, Iraq 
January 27, 2007 Mr. David Soroko, International Relief 
and Development 
U.S. embassy, Green 
Zone, Baghdad, Iraq 
January 28, 2007 Captain William Wald, Headquarters 
and Headquarters Company 
Commander, 414 Civil Affairs 
Camp Liberty, Iraq 
  113
Date Interviewee Location 
Battalion 
January 28, 2007 Commander (USN) John McGinn, 
Executive Officer, 414 Civil Affairs 
Battalion 
Camp Liberty, Iraq 
January 28, 2007 Group interview with enlisted and 
NCOs, Alpha Company, 414 Civil 
Affairs Battalion 
Camp Loyalty, Iraq 
January 28, 2007 Major Philip McIntire, Commander, 
Alpha Company, 414 Civil Affairs 
Battalion 
Camp Loyalty, Iraq 
January 29, 2007 Major John Crean, S9, 2nd Brigade, 2nd 
Infantry Division 
Camp Loyalty, Iraq 
January 29, 2007 Major Jack Sattnick, Alpha Company, 
414 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Loyalty, Iraq 
January 29, 2007 First Sergeant Marvin Gonzalez, First 
Sergeant, Alpha Company, 414 Civil 
Affairs Battalion 
Camp Loyalty, Iraq 
January 29, 2007 Captain Clifford, Commander, Tactical 
PSYOP Detachment 
Camp Loyalty, Iraq 
January 30, 2007 Major Duane Butler, Commander, 
Charlie Company, 414 Civil Affairs 
Battalion 
Camp Taji, Iraq 
January 30, 2007 Team interview, 2/C/414 Civil Affairs 
Battalion 
Camp Taji, Iraq 
January 30, 2007 Team interview, 3/C/414 Civil Affairs 
Battalion 
Camp Taji, Iraq 
January 30, 2007 Major Juliet, S9, 1st, 2nd Infantry 
Division 
Camp Taji, Iraq 
January 30, 2007 Team interview, 4/C/414 Civil Affairs 
Battalion 
Camp Taji, Iraq 
January 31, 2007 First Sergeant Bonita Jones, First 
Sergeant, Charlie Company, 414 Civil 
Affairs Battalion 
Camp Taji, Iraq 
January 31, 2007 Major Duane Butler, Commander, 
Charlie Company, 414 Civil Affairs 
Battalion 
Camp Taji, Iraq 
January 31, 2007 Team interview, CATB/C/414 Civil 
Affairs Battalion 
Camp Taji, Iraq 
January 31, 2007 Major Simpson, S-9,2nd, 82nd Airborne 
Division 
Camp Taji, Iraq 
February, 1, 2007 Colonel Manny Deemer, Director, 
Counterinsurgency Academy 
Camp Taji, Iraq 
February 2, 2007 Sergeant First Class Robert Goulet, 
Bravo Company, 414 Civil Affairs 
Camp Falcon, Iraq 
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Date Interviewee Location 
Battalion 
February 2,2007 First Sergeant Timothy Stockinger 
Jones, First Sergeant, Bravo Company, 
414 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Falcon, Iraq 
February 2, 2007 Major Erickson, Acting Commander, 
Bravo, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Falcon, Iraq 
February 2, 2007 Group interview with enlisted, NCOs 
and officers, Bravo, 414 Civil Affairs 
Battalion 
Camp Falcon, Iraq 
February 3, 2007 CW5 James Anderson, Assistant G1, 
358 Civil Affairs Brigade 
Camp Slayer, Iraq 
February 3, 2007 Lieutenant Colonel Fitz Fitzpatrick, 
Deputy Commander, 358 Civil Affairs 
Brigade 
Camp Slayer, Iraq 
February 3, 2007 Captain Reppenger, S-1, Headquarters 
and Headquarters Company, 414 Civil 
Affairs Battalion 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
February 3, 2007 Group interview with enlisted and 
NCOs, S-1, Headquarters and 
Headquarters Company, 414 Civil 
Affairs Battalion 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
February 3, 2007 Lieutenant Commander (USN) Carlos 
Iglesias, Commander, Headquarters and 
Headquarters Company, 402 Civil 
Affairs Battalion 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
February 3, 2007 Phone interview, Major Joe Peterson, 
S-9, JSOTF-AP 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
February 3,2007 Captain Kim, Commander, combined 
B/402 and B/404 Civil Affairs 
Company, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Warhorse, Iraq 
February 4, 2007 Commander (USN) Burdick, 
Headquarters and Headquarters 
Company, 402 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
February 4, 2007 Mr. Joe Shroader, U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, Deputy Director, National 
Coordination Team 
Camp Warhorse, Iraq 
February 4, 2007 Mr. Reed Whitlock, Department of 
State, Baquba Provincial 
Reconstruction Team 
Camp Warhorse, Iraq 
February 5, 2007 Group interview with enlisted and 
NCOs, B/402 and B/404 Civil Affairs 
Battalion 
Camp Warhorse, Iraq 
February 5, 2007 Group interview with officers, B/402 
and B/404 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Warhorse, Iraq 
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Date Interviewee Location 
February 5, 2007 Mr. Joe Shroader, U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, Deputy Director, National 
Coordination Team 
Camp Warhorse, Iraq 
February 6, 2007 Command Sergeant Major Davis, C, 
402 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
February 6, 2007 Sergeant First Class Cullen, NCOIC, 
Salah ad Din  Provincial Reconstruction 
Team, A/402 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
February 6, 2007 Group interview with enlisted and 
NCOs assigned to Saleh ah Din 
Provincial Reconstruction Team, A/402 
Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
February 6, 2007 Group interview with officers assigned 
to Saleh ah Din Provincial 
Reconstruction Team, A/402 Civil 
Affairs Battalion 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
February 6, 2007 Major Menzemer, Commander, Salah 
ad Din  Provincial Reconstruction 
Team, A/402 Civil Affairs Battalion 
Camp Speicher, Iraq 
February 7, 2007 Lieutenant Colonel Joe Stanton, 
Operations Planner, National 
Coordination Team 
U.S. Embassy, Green 
Zone, Baghdad, Iraq 
February 8, 2007 Lieutenant Junior Grade (USN) 
Heyrick, RROC, Assigned to 
Headquarters and Headquarters 
Company, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion 
from the 354 Civil Affairs Brigade 
Camp Liberty, Iraq 
February 9, 2007 Captain Tisdale, G9 office, 25th Infantry 
Division 
Camp Liberty, Iraq 
February 9, 2007 Colonel Dave Alvin, Deputy C9,MNCI Camp Victory, Iraq 
February 9, 2007 Major Johnny Spruiel, Executive 
Officer, C9, MNCI 
Camp Victory, Iraq 
February  10, 2007 Major Jose Mediera, C3 Joint 
Operating Center (Civil-Military Desk), 
MNCI 
Camp Victory, Iraq 
February 10, 2007 Lieutenant Jose Rose, National 
Coordination Team 
U.S. Embassy, Green 
Zone, Baghdad, Iraq 
February 11,2007 Lieutenant William Woods, 
Commander, 414 Civil Affairs 
Battalion 
Camp Liberty, Iraq 
February 11, 2007 Commander Downing (USN), Liaison 
to MNCI C9 from MNFI National 
Coordination Team 
Camp Victory, Iraq 
February 11, 2007 Lieutenant Colonel Joe Stanton, U.S. embassy, Green 
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Date Interviewee Location 
Operations Planner, National 
Coordination Team 
Zone, Baghdad, Iraq 
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